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INTRODUCTON
S INCE 1950, when the initial draft of the Model Business Cor-
poration Act was published under the auspices of the American
Bar Association,1 a numerical majority of the states have totally or
substantially revised their corporation statutes. The major lines of
this development were sufficiently clear that by 1958 a Law and
Contemporary Problems symposium could discern an entire "new
look in corporation law."2 After 1960, the pace of revision seemed
'In 1946, a draft of what became the Model Act was reported to the Section of
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law of the American Bar Association by the
Section's Committee on Corporate Laws, but it was 1950 before the text assumed
substantially the form in which it has been widely adopted. It has been continuously
revised since its 1950 epithany. See 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. V (1960). The
1960 revision of the Model Act will hereinafter be cited in lieu of the 1953 edition
only when amendment has occurred since the latter's publication.
2 Symposium: The New Look in Corporation Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD.
175-398 (1958).
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to accelerate, both in the number and importance of the states re-
structuring their statutes, and in the variety and novelty of the ideas
finding expression in the statutes. During this period, New York
carried through the most comprehensive revision ever accomplished
by any state; Massachusetts, South Carolina, Wyoming, and Arkan-
sas enacted important statutes;3 Pennsylvania substantially revised
its existing law; Florida enacted the first separate dose corporation
statute, while other states included a variety of special provisions
recognizing the peculiar problems of the incorporated partnership;
and other states, most notably, Delaware, initiated studies looking
towards substantial revision.4 The Model Act continued to exert
great influence. Some states adopted it as if it were a uniform act
requiring near identity of provisions in all states, and, indeed, the
ABA Committee on Corporate Law has seemed to regard its product
as such. All other states have taken account of the Model Act, using
it as the point of departure for their own statutes-both by adopt-
ing some of its provisions and by reacting to others-with the best
statutes extensively supplementing it.
Outside of the United States, the post-1960 period witnessed im-
portant statutory revisions and studies. The Jenkins Committee
recommended far-reaching amendment of the United Kingdom's
1948 Companies Act; 5 but as of today these 1963 recommendations
have not been adopted. In the Commonwealth, Ghana enacted a
statute, drafted by Professor L. C. B. Gower, which is the culmina-
tion of companies law as developed in Britain and the Common-
wealth. 6 Germany's 1937 Aktiengesetz (Stock Company Law) has
been superseded by a 1965 enactment, while France, as of the date
of writing, has yet to enact its draft Business Associations Law of
1965.
Although this article deduces no metaphysical significance from
parallel corporation law revisions in many states and nations of
varying levels of economic and political sophistication, there are
8 Other states enacting new corporation laws are Utah (1961), Mississippi (1962),
Nebraska (1962), South Dakota (1965), and Washington (1965), but most of these
contain significant provisions noted in this article. States which had enacted statutes
prior to 1960 continued to amend their laws in various particulars, some of which
are noted. See 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 3 (Supp. 1966) (introduction).
"Other statutory revisions known to be underway include Georgia and Maryland.
rCompany Law Committee, Report, CMD. No. 1749 (1962).
OFinal Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working and Administra-
tion of the Present Company Law of Ghana (1961) [hereinafter cited as Ghana Rep.].
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enough new ideas current to deserve analysis. That is the purpose
of this article. The take-off date is somewhat arbitrarily rigged at
1959 in order to pick up the finely wrought 1959 Connecticut
statute and the Iowa law, which includes many unique and some
ill-considered provisions. Currency of the material discussed is
limited only by the author's ability to keep up-to-date on new de-
velopments and the extent to which he is attuned to the gossip of
the trade. Except for novelty of ideas, no particular statutes are
selected for special consideration, whether they be corporate law
studies and enactments in which the author has had a personal hand,
or statutes of great importance such as New York's. Esoteric items,
so often tempting to corporate law specialists, will be avoided, with-
in the limits of human frailty. Instead, this article's objective is a
selective and critical survey of recent statutes and some guarded
projections and suggestions for the future of state corporation law.
I. INCORPORATION PROCEDURE
Gradually, but steadily, incorporation procedure is being simpli-
fied in many jurisdictions by deleting ritualistic relics of an earlier
day. It seems strange, however, that the streamlining has so slowly
evolved, since limited liability through incorporation has long been
accepted as an undisputed privilege everywhere. Archaistic formali-
ties originally existed to control if not discourage limited liability;
the law's oft-noted tendency to lag behind substantive changes in
practice and attitudes presumably explains the slow removal of these
now useless and sometimes inconvenient statutory procedures.7
1. Incorporators: Several recent enactments, together with the
1962 draft of the Model Act, authorize a single individual to func-
don as an incorporator.8 Not only does this sound application of
Occam's razor recognize the largely formal role of incorporators,
but it eliminates any argument that requiring multiple incorpora-
tors implies some intrinsic vice in the one-man corporation.9 A
7 Sometimes cumbersome procedures survive a statutory revision. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 10, §§ 21(3)-(17) (1959) (requiring subscriptions and payments before in-
corporation; articles of corporation filed with probate judge); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 5309-123 (Supp. 1964) (paper publication required).
8 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 47 (Supp. 1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-501 (1966);
KY. REV. STAT. § 271.025 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.03 (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 351.050 (Supp. 1965); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2051 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. Bus.
COl'. LAW § 401; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-201 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. §
12-14.2 (Supp. 1965).
9Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.2d 677 (1955),
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few statutes have taken the more advanced tack of eliminating any
requirement, express or implied, that an incorporator be a "natural"
person.10 This is sensible when much incorporation is in fact
handled by "corporation service companies" who supply incorpo-
rators as well as other functional mechanical aids. Although corpo-
rate incorporators must act through their agents, this involves little
likelihood of contest as to the authority of such persons to act for
the incorporator."
2. Articles of Incorporation: A variety of procedures have sim-
plified the preparation of articles of incorporation.' 2 A trend de-
veloped some time ago to discourage recitals of corporate powers,'2
although sometimes articles may limit the plenary grant of power
given by statutes to most corporations. 14 Recitals of purposes still
pose problems because of professional prolixity and an ingrained
fear that just possibly at some remote future date the serene book
store may wish to manufacture rockets or high-speed computers.
Although widespread codification of "liberal" rules on ultra vires15
on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956). For a searching critique of this
fantastic decision, see Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One or Two-Man
Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REv. 471 (1956). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (1965) (legis-
lative overruling of Park Terrace).
"See, e.g., IL.. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157A6 (Supp. 1965); Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.025
(1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-201 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-14.2 (Supp.
1965). Earlier statutes, e.g., IowA CODE §§ 496A.2(1), .48 (1962); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 21.2 (c) (1963), also took this liberal position. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12
Geo. 6, c. 38, § 178 recognizes that a corporation may be a director of another
corporation.
""Wisconsin allows an alternative of whether to name initial directors when the
articles of incorporation are filed or to leave the management temporarily to the
incorporators with the directors remaining undisclosed until elected later. Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 180.32, A9 (Supp. 1966). Occasionally, there may be good business (or other)
reasons why the real principals do not wish to be immediately revealed as directors,
and the Wisconsin statute accommodates this interest.
"2Statutes now encourage efforts to keep the articles current and eliminate stale
or outdated matter. Permission to restate articles, see ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP.
Aar § 59 (1953), is almost-always adopted by the newer statutes with some varia-
tions. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 13(c) (Supp. 1965) (specifies informa-
tion "which shall not for any purpose be treated as a permanent part of the articles,"
i.e., names of initial direetors, date of the annual meeting, name and address of the
initial registered agent and the post office address of the registered office, and the
corporate fiscal year).
"3See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 48 (1953) which dispenses -with recitals
in the articles of the corporate powers. This provision has been widely copied. See
2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. Aar ANN. § 48, 2.01, 6 (Supp. 1966).
" See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-12.2 (a) (Supp. 1965). (Each corporation, unless other-
wise stated in its articles of incorporation, shall have the enumerated powers.)
" The prototype provision is ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 6 (1953). N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-18 (a) (1) (1965) adds to the Model Act provision that in a share-
holder's suit to enjoin an ultra vires act, he must show that he has not at any time
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should rationally induce lawyers to be less concerned to cover every
possible corporate activity, the inconvenience of amending the char-
ter, at least of a publicly owned corporation, militates in the direc-
tion of all-inclusiveness. If the old theory that recitals of purpose
are needed as disclosure devices for shareholders and creditors ever
had any validity in practice, it is surely meaningless when charter
clauses go on endlessly listing activities in which the corporation is
not engaged and probably never will be. The actual business done
or intended to be done by the enterprise is lost in the paperwork.
Since it would only cause more problems to require articles to re-
cite the actual or intended business, it is well to authorize the
articles to state "either (1) the purpose or purposes for which the
corporation is organized; or (2) that the corporation shall have
unlimited power to engage in and to do any lawful act concerning
any or all lawful businesses for which corporations may be organized
under this act."' 6 Persons interested in the matter can use more
informative sources than the charter to discover actual business
done.
3. Corporate Powers: The steady enlargement of corporate
powers in the newer statutes, coupled with the conventional Model
Act section drawing the sting from the old ultra vires doctrine,
leaves corporations with virtually all the powers they need or wish.
One particular power does require brief comment, however. Even
in some traditionally strict jurisdictions, 7 statutes empower corpo-
rations to enter into partnerships, joint ventures, and the like."
Two recent enactments are more cautious. Arkansas' 9 permits part-
nership agreements only if the charter or a stockholder majority
prior thereto assented to the challenged act and is not acting collusively with the
corporate officers in so suing. The North Carolina statute was enacted in 1955.
26WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.46 (c) (1965); accord, IOWA CODE § 496A.49 (3) (1962).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-204(3) (Supp. 1966) permits a "statement that the
corporation shall have unlimited power to engage in and to do any lawful act
concerning any or all lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated
under this act .... ." See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.03 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 78.035 (3) (1963).
Some statutes grant to corporations all capacity of natural persons, but limit
corporate authority to the ambit of the stated purposes. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §
30-114(1) (Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-202(a) (1960); LA. REv. STAT. § 12:12 (A)
(1951).
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17(b)(6) (1965).
18 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-291 (e) (4) (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.385 (5)
(Supp. 1965); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LMw § 202 (a) (15). See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
Aar § 4 (g) (1953).19 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-104 (B) (6) (1966).
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(absent charter provision) authorizes it, but allows the board alone
to cause the corporation to enter into a limited partnership or to
form a "joint adventure arrangement." The latter is limited to
either "the joint prosecution of a single undertaking" or "prosecu-
tion of successive joint undertakings or business activities over a
period not exceeding five (5) years. '20 Virginia requires a vote of
two-thirds of all shares, voting and non-voting, unless authorized by
charter, in order to validate partnership arrangements.2 1
As one looks at the newer statutes, one discerns the logical con-
sequence of vesting corporations with "all the powers of a natural
person of full capacity."22 This is the language of the Companies
Code of Ghana which, in Professor Gower's view, "makes for brevity
and simplicity and probably produces rather greater certainty,"
since it avoids necessarily lengthy enumeration of specific powers
and the need for some general catchall clause of residual power.23
A 1965 Minnesota amendment seems to have gone further than any
American jurisdiction in authorizing the articles to state that the
corporation "shall have unlimited power to engage in and to do any
lawful act concerning any and all lawful businesses for which corpo-
rations may be organized under the statute."24
This provision is, indeed, unusual, since most American statutes
disapprove the creation of the "all purpose" corporation with capac-
ity to exercise unlimited powers. Hence, many statutes explicitly
subordinate many powers to the corporation's stated purposes,25 al-
though authorizing others to be exercised without regard to pur-
pose.26 But assuming skillful draftsmanship, this is just a difference
in form and terminology, since the sum of corporate powers granted
by the statutes is plenary, and charters often authorize every con-
ceivable sort of business the corporation might wish to conduct.
One cannot reasonably doubt the good sense of enlarging corpo-
rate capacities, and then shifting policy questions away from debate
as to whether the corporation does (or should) have the power to
2 0 Ibid.
21 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3 (1964). The Virginia statute was enacted in 1956.
22 Companies Code, 1961, § 24 (Ghana).
23 Ghana Rep. 41.
-4 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.03 (Supp. 1965); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.04 (1)
(Supp. 1965). All-purpose provisions endorsed by ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr
§ 48 (1953) may accomplish the same effect.
2r E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAv § 202 (a).
2E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-291 (1960), as amended, § 33-291 (e) (Supp.
1965).
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whether the power should be curbed or controlled in some way
as a matter of policy.27 Thus, for example, a corporation (like any
principal) would have the general capacity to indemnify when,
whom, and how it wishes, but a statute would properly address
itself to appropriate limits on this power as measured by policy
factors.
4. Recordation Requirements: Several recent revisions have
simplified the incorporation process (and, indeed, all requirements
for public disclosure of essential corporate documents) by modifying
traditional requirements that documents be locally recorded as well
as centrally filed. Earlier, most states had stipulated, in one way or
another, that failure to record articles of incorporation would not
imply lack of de jure corporate status requiring recourse to the
cloudy and uncertain de facto doctrine with its various distinc-
tions.2 8 A few states have eliminated local recordation (if indeed
they ever had it) so that central filing is sufficient. 2  Others have
yielded to expected pressures to retain recordation but only require
central filing and direct the central office to transmit the papers
for local recordation. 30
The chief argument for retaining local recordation-apart from
vested interests of local officials and districts in recordation fees-is
its convenience to local attorneys and, particularly, title searchers.
However, the document will be recorded only in the county where
the corporation's registered office is located, although the corpora-
tion may be doing a multi-county business, so that recordation,
somewhat accidentally, serves the convenience only of an attorney
practicing in the county where the office is situated. Actually, where
a small monetary penalty is the only sanction-as, indeed, it should
be-there is less incentive for prompt local recordation, so that the
attorney or title searcher cannot be certain that a necessary docu-
2 7 Such is the case in the Arkansas and Virginia limitations on powers to enter
partnerships. Notes 19, 21 supra and accompanying text.
2s This was typically accomplished by language indicating that filing of the docu-
ment consummated the transaction even though the document was not recorded-
failure to record resulting in only a monetary penalty. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-4 (b)
(1965). A recent example is Amt. STAT. ANN. § 64-117 (B) (1966).
29 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-285 (1960), as amended, §§ 33-285 (a), (b) (Supp.
1965); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 12 (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.070
(Supp. 1965) (recordation requirement abolished); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-54 (1960);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-11.6 (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-50 (1962). Accord,
ABA-AL1 MODEL Bus. Cor. Aar § 49 (1953).
0 3E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.07 (1947); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 104 (g).
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ment has been locally recorded. Thus, even where it is demanded
by statute, a prudent attorney would still inquire at the central
filing office, since the absence of the document in the local file does
not establish the existence or non-existence of the corporation. In
title searching, reliance upon local recordation is well placed only
if (1) the title being searched is for land located in the county of
the registered office, 31 and (2) it is certain that the document has
in fact been locally recorded. Many local corporations will have
land in more than one locale, and since the document may not in
fact be locally recorded, the title searcher would be foolish to draw
a firm conclusion if he fails to turn up a particular document.3 2
5. Organization Meeting: This "meeting" is often a paper trans-
action-a set of minutes signed by all parties. The newer statutes
rightly validate this procedure, since the organization meeting is
seldom one in which the parties need to get together face-to-face and
exchange ideas or elicit a consensus from conflicting views. In all
events, where the statute requires a directors' organization meeting,
the increasingly common provision for informal director action 33-
finally adopted even by the Model Act 34-sanctions this procedure;
and in other states where the incorporators "organize" the corpora-
tion, special provisions, as in New York, will validate such pro-
cedure.3 5 In either case, statutes retain the fiction that someone
takes "action," and that the signed documents reflect "the action
so taken."3 6
21 Apparently, an occasional statute does require recording in every county where
realty is owned. E.g., MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. §§ 15-112 (1955). Indiana requires
filing articles of merger in each county where any constituent corporation owns real
property. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-235 (1960).
22 At least two recent statutes specify in mandatory terms the duty of the Secre-
tary of State to file documents and in effect withdraw any discretion not to accept
them. Thus, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-10 (B) (Supp. 1966) requires filing if the
Department of State finds the document is duly executed, the corporate name avail-
able, and taxes, fees, and proof of publication tendered. The genesis of this provision
was S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-14.4 (Supp. 1965). Several states authorize the articles of in-
corporation to state a post-filing effective date, usually not more than ninety days
after filing. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.041 (1) (Supp. 1965); IoWA CODE § 496A.49 (12)
(1962).
Although the discussion of recordation requirements is developed more than the
intrinsic merits of the provisions warrant, it is desirable to dispel the empty argu-
ments asserted in support of the requirement. In all events, presumed convenience
of title searchers should be subordinated to the corporate interest in quick and flexible
incorporation procedures.31 See jurisdictions listed in 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 39A, 6 (Supp. 1966).
"43 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 39A (Supp. 1966).
32 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 404 (b).
62 Ibid.
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It would be simpler to dispense with the fiction and state that
the corporation has been "duly organized" when a document con-
taining by-laws and designating the initial officers (or directors, or
both) has been signed by the appropriate persons. After all, we have
pretty well eliminated any fiction that incorporators or subscribers or
promoters have "adopted" or "acted upon" or "approved" articles of
incorporation before filing them. In sum, the incorporation process
could be simplified further, both linguistically and in practice,
simply by statutory statements solely in terms of signatures to docu-
ments, some of which must be filed, coupled with payment of a
minimum capital. Such simplicity of statement and practice is codi-
fied in the Draft Companies Law of Israel.87
Following the Model Act, most new corporation statutes dis-
tinguish between (1) the coming-into-being of the corporation (typi-
cally accomplished by centrally filing the articles) and (2) beginning
to do business (contingent upon payment of a nominal capital).
This creates certain complexities since the statutes and cases must
enumerate the liabilities of parties when there is (1) defective incor-
poration or (2) failure to pay in capital.
6. "De Facto" Doctrines and "Estoppel": It seems generally
assumed that adoption of a Model Act-type provision inaugurating
corporate existence on issuing the incorporation certificate, which
is also declared "conclusive evidence" of incorporation, 8 eliminates
the concepts of "de facto" corporate existence and "estoppel" to
deny corporateness. 39 Thus, the Model Act draftsmen observed that
"since it is unlikely that any steps short of securing a certificate of
incorporation would be held to constitute apparent compliance, the
possibility that a de facto corporation could exist under such a
provision is remote. '40 If this widely adopted Model Act provision
is intended to displace these supplementary judicial doctrines, it
has not succeeded; only the focus of the problem has shifted. It may
well be that the doctrine of "de facto corporation" has no further
37 Israel Draft Companies Bill § 2 (1957) states: "For the purpose of forming a
company, there shall be filed with the registrar through an advocate- (I) the pro-
posed Rules and an application for registration, signed by all the founders; (2) a
list of the first directors, signed by each of them; (3) notice of the address of the
registered office." Under § 4, "from the date of registration the company shall be
a legal body, capable of liabilities, rights and legal actions."
's ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 50 (1953).
' Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 446 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1964) expressly so
states.
402 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 50, 4 (1960).
[Vol. 1966: 875
Vol. 1966: 875] CORPORATION STATUTES: 1959-1966
role to perform. 41 This interpretation is compatible with the statis-
tical showing that absence of central filing carries the greatest prob-
ability that a de facto corporation would not be judicially erected.42
Particularly in a jurisdiction which only requires central filing, in-
voking the de facto doctrine on the basis of something less than
filing would violate the statutory purpose. The same result should
follow even where local recordation is still required.
The effect of this Model Act provision on the related "corpora-
tion by estoppel" concept is less certain, and the few returns so far
received reveal judicial conflict. In one of the several jurisdictions
which have coupled Model Act section 5043 with section 1394--
making personally liable "all persons who assumed to act as a cor-
poration without authority so to do"-atleast one court has held
that estoppel concepts are abolished by this statutory combination.45
There is much to be said in favor of this clear-cut result: file the
documents and one enjoys limited liability (subject to paying in
minimum capital), but fail to file and he lacks "authority" to "act
as a corporation" and therefore is subject to partnership liability.
Absent section 139, the question is whether "estoppel" concepts
survive enactment only of section 50. The Maryland court has held,
without reference to its version of this statute,46 that an individual
officer of a defectively organized corporation could plead estoppel
to bar suit against him.47 This result seems appropriate so long
as the statute does not impose partnership liability. The public
policy of compelling due filing of corporate documents is not so
overwhelming as to demand abolition of all estoppel concepts with
the concomitant result of imposing strict personal liability on the
parties who may have innocently acted on a supposed corporate
basis. Absent legislative clarity on the matter, section 50 should
be read only as stating that after a certain event the corporation
"exists," but not as implying that, in all other circumstances, limited
liability is precluded. Without the equivalent of section 139, sec-
41 See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1964).
"Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1153,
1176-77 (1952).
," ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT § 50 (1953) makes filing the articles conclusive
of the fact of incorporation.
"ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar §. 139 (1953).
Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1964).
SMD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 131 (b) (1957). The Maryland statute was enacted in
1951.
47 Cranson v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964).
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tion 50 should not be construed as ipso facto removing the tradi-
tional discretionary power of courts to decide particular cases so as
to implement reasonable expectations and promote the security of
transactions.
It is apparent, then, that the recent statutory enactments-other
than those which purport to declare partnership liability for persons
not complying with filing procedures-have not settled the question
of the extent to which the de facto and estoppel doctrines continue
to apply. Given the ease with which corporations can be formed,
it would seem desirable now to draft a statute making filing an
absolute prerequisite for limited liability and imposing partnership
liability when compliance is not proven, thereby definitively aban-
doning the old and uncertain common law doctrines of de facto
corporation and estoppel.
7. Doing Business Before Receiving Capital: Assuming that a
corporation is duly formed, the newer statutes usually disable it
from doing business before a minimum amount of capital is paid
in. Thus, payment of nominal capital is now a pre-condition only
of doing business rather than, as in some older statutes, a prerequi-
site of corporate status. The Model Act 4 8 typifying most newer
statutes, makes no advance in protecting creditors, and indeed it is
doubtful that this should be a proper function of the incorporation
provisions. Most statutes require only a nominal capital, if any at
all 4 9 and exact only a liability to pay the unpaid portion of this
minimum capital. 0 Thus, if, as is possible in some states, a corpora-
tion may start doing business with a one dollar capitalization,8 '
the statutory liability is only for a maximum of one dollar. Whether
or not this will induce courts to extend the common law authority
subjecting an insider of a grossly undercapitalized corporation to
personal liability will depend largely upon whether courts read the
"8ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AT § 51 (1953) ($1,000 required to be paid in).
"9The range of dollar figures for those jurisdictions requiring payment of a
dollar amount appears in 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 51, 2.02 (2) (1960, Supp.
1966). The amounts vary from $200 (Georgia) to $1,000 (Utah, South Dakota, and
a number of other states which revised their laws prior to the cut-off date here
discussed). No minimum capital is required in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-7(5) (1965).
50 See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 43 (e) (1953).
1 The familiar case of Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1942), involved a corporation which launched its operations with just such a munifi.
cent capital contribution.
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statutorily required minimum capital as abrogating any common
law liabilities.
The problem is one which corporate law revisers have given up
on, hoping that commercial practice, availability of information,
and creditor self-interest will take up the slack. Some states do
require a minimum dollar amount,5 2 and arguably such an amount
would deter courts from exacting additional personal liabilities
under common law. The difficulties are that any amount which
would protect creditors is too large to be practical and politic; and,
absent strict controls, any amount paid in, large or small, can still
be removed by reductions of capital. Perhaps a required dollar
amount (say $1,000) may occasionally deter a few shoe string enter-
prises, although any such consequence would be hard to predict
and harder to verify. At least one jurisdiction imposes personal
liability on directors not only for the minimum capital promised in
the articles, but also for corporate debts incurred until the initial
stated capital has come inM Once again, this safeguard may be more
in terrorem than real since such quasi-partnership liability may be
avoided simply by making (and then withdrawing by impeccable
compliance with statutory procedures) the minimum capital, for
nothing in the typical statutes compels retention of the minimum
capital once paid in. 4
8. Promoters' Contracts: Although some efforts, not wholly ade-
quate, would substitute a statutory rule for the unsatisfactory com-
mon law concepts of de facto corporation and corporation by
estoppel, nothing has been done in recent corporation revisions to
clarify the equally chaotic law on promoters' 5 and other pre-incor-
poration contracts.56 This is indeed unfortunate since the promoter,
not inevitably a "bad guy," is an indispensable figure in forming
a corporation. Often-probably most often-the "promoters" of a
"2 See note 49 supra.
" S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-14.6 (b) (Supp. 1965).
" But ef. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.04 (6) (Supp. 1965) (requiring $1,000 minimum
capital) and § 801.39(5) (Supp. 1965) (forbidding reduction of capital below the
$1,000 minimum).
11 The only two statutes attempting to meet the problem are old. They are MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 21.8 (1963) and KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2807 (1964). Their inade-
quacies have been exposed in Kessler, Promoters' Contracts: A Statutory Solution,
15 RuTGms L. REv. 566, 576-81 (1961).
50Pre-incorporation subscription contracts have fared better under most new
statutory revisions. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 16 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 88-842 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Bus. Cor. LAw § 503; S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15.5
(Supp. 1965).
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close corporation, and frequently those of a small enterprise looking
towards a moderate public investment, will be the businessmen who
are seeking to launch a bona fide enterprise, perhaps from scratch
or perhaps as successor to a sole proprietorship or partnership.
Stressing this aspect of "promotion," Professor Kessler has compre-
hensively restudied this area of the law to assess the merits and
demerits of the common law rules and has evolved a useful draft
statute which would mark a great advance over the common law,
certainly as to clarity and, in large measure, as to substantive mat-
ters.57 The heart of his proposal would relieve a promoter, even
before incorporation, from liability on a promoter's contract (as he
defines the term) if the contract itself discloses that a corporation
is to be organized and if no clause makes the promoter a party to
the agreement. The corporation automatically succeeds to the con-
tract unless it repudiates it within eight days after either incorpora-
tion or acquisition of full knowledge of the contract terms, which-
ever is later. The draft statute also spells out corporate obligations
on repudiation. A particular strength of the statute is its providing
a rational pattern of risk distribution which may be freely varied
by the parties.
The Republic of Ghana is apparently the only jurisdiction
rooted in Anglo-American law to adopt a statutory rule for pro-
moters' contracts. Much simpler than the Kessler proposal, it first
authorizes ratification of a promoter's contract, thereby eliminating
a hypertechnical agency rule requiring a principal's existence at the
time of the contract, and second, declares the promoter personally
bound on, and benefited by, the contract prior to ratification. 8 In
this respect, the Ghana statute inverts the Kessler proposal, which
relieves the promoter from all liability absent language making him
a party. The choice is not critical so long as each statute permits
contractual variation. The Ghana statute unfortunately leaves open
the common law question of a promoter's continuing liability after
corporate ratification. Even if the language implies a novation upon
17 Kessler, supra note 55, at 605-06.
5s See Companies Code, 1961, § 13 (Ghana); Ghana Rep. 32. Section 12 of the
Ghana Companies Code is a strong reaffirmation (and extension) of the fiduciary
duties of promoters. Section 12 (4) entitles the corporation to rescind a transaction
between the promoter and the company unless there has been full disclosure of all
material facts known to the promoter plus approval or ratification by an independent
board of directors or by all the shareholders or by the "general meeting" of the
company without counting votes of or controlled by the promoter.
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ratification-and this is uncertain-there is no reason for not estab-
lishing the fact explicitly. 9
II. MANAGEMENT: DIREcToRs AND OFFICERS
1. Compensation: The aid-to-directors movement has now so ex-
hausted itself in an orgy of indulgence and favoritism that little
more remains to be done on the state level. This is illustrated by
the fact that the forms and varieties of compensating directors and
officers are now limited, for practical purposes, only by federal tax
laws and even then only incompletely. Virtually all recent state
revisions adopt the Model Act's expansive grant of power to com-
pensate "directors, officers and employees." 60 Besides conventional
monetary forms of compensation, Colorado grandly authorizes "edu-
cation, housing, social and recreational services, and other similar
aids and services" to directors, officers, and employees of the corpora-
tion or of any subsidiary.61 Although not a product of the most
recent revision, Pennsylvania overcomes even this limitation by au-
thorizing "allowances or pensions" not only to directors, officers,
and employees, but also "after their death, to their dependents or
beneficiaries, whether or not such a grant was made during their
lifetime." 62 This dispenses with arguments that widows' consolation
prizes are really a form of compensation to an employee, partic-
ularly when no such arrangement was bargained-for during the em-
ployee's- lifetime.
Whatever the merits of corporate generosity to widows, current
tendencies to treat families of related corporations on a system or
consolidated basis makes it sensible for statutes to empower the
parent to compensate the subsidiary's directors, officers, and employ-
ees and particularly to authorize use of personnel options to
acquire the parent's shares. There may be a ready and active market
for the parent's shares (e.g., American Telephone and Telegraph
Co.) but not for the subsidiary's shares (e.g., Western Electric Co.);
moreover, the parent corporation may reasonably wish not to dilute
its complete or near-complete stock control by putting stock of the
"0 The Kessler proposal need not resolve this problem since the promoter is not
liable at all absent contrary agreement. However, the issue would arise if the
contract did stipulate for continuing, i.e., post-incorporation and post-ratification,
liability, and the corporation was unable or unwilling to perform thereafter.
O0 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACr § 4(p) (1953).
81 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-1(16) (1963).
02 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-316 (1958); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.31 (1957).
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subsidiary in other hands. The Virginia statute, which antedates
the period primarily considered, broadly provides for compensation
by, and stock options from, parent corporations" for personnel of
corporate subsidiaries.
Boards of directors now almost always enjoy the Model Act
privilege of fixing compensation for themselves in both director and
officer capacities, usually exempt from statutory (and presumably
common law) controls on "interested director" transactions. 4 Run-
ning counter to this trend is Utah's voice in the wilderness, exacting
for such freedom the moderate price of mandatory disclosure to
the shareholders of the facts concerning compensation except when
the corporation is subject to the SEC proxy rules where, presum-
ably, there will be sufficient disclosure.65
2. Directors' Liabilities: Virtually all new statutes adopt the
Model Act provision which specifies various director liabilities for
improper dividends and other distributions and which grants cer-
tain defenses, among them good faith reliance on books and records
and also on financial statements represented to be correct by the
appropriate officer or certified by independent accountants.00 Iowa
apparently feels these standards are too stringent, and therefore
makes directors liable only if they acted "in willful or negligent
violation" of the statute or restrictions in the articles of incorpora-
tion.67
Of the few revisions which codify the directors' general duty,
there are subtle variations. Thus the statutes generally agree that
all directors must act "in good faith and with that degree of dili-
gence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise
under similar circumstances in like positions."68 However, these
few statutes vary either in not naming the beneficiaries of the duty,69
or in stating that the duty runs only "to the corporation" 70 or "to
"3 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3 (o) (1964).
64 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 33 (1953).
"' UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-33 (1962).
06 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Aar § 43 (1953).
67IowA CODE §§ 496A.44 (1), (2) (1962).
68N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 717. Pennsylvania calls for "diligence, care and skill
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in their
personal business affairs." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (1958). This article
does not try to plumb the subtle depths of the distinction between New York's and
Pennsylvania's formulations.
69 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 717.
7OPennsylvania declares that officers and directors "stand in a fiduciary relation
to the corporation." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (1958).
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the corporation and to its shareholders." 71 The latter formulation
certainly strengthens the hand of shareholders in the unfortunately
frequent situation where insiders act from their strategic position
upon uncommunicated knowledge to buy "outside" interests at
favorable prices or where insiders otherwise use their vantage point
to force minority interests out of the corporation. 72
Even in the jurisdictions where paper declarations of fiduciary
duties are strongest, there may be real practical problems of obtain-
ing jurisdiction over non-resident directors. Sequestration has often
been an effective method in Delaware, 73 but that state is, under-
standably, experiencing pressures to drop such a means of bringing
non-Delawareans into the Court of Chancery. The most effective
remedy, that is, a non-resident director statute, has been adopted
since 1959 by Connecticut 4 and South Carolina,75 and earlier by
North Carolina.70
3. Interested Director and Officer Transactions: Relatively few
new statutory revisions have dealt with transactions by interested
directors and officers or by corporations with interlocking director-
ates, although the common law is confusing and needs clarification
and, for some jurisdictions, correction. Although some pre-19 6 0
statutes effectively treated the problem, most notably California 77
and North Carolina,78 since that date Connecticut,79 New York, 0
and South Carolina8 ' seem to have been the only states to deal
directly with the problem.
(a) Persons Affected by Statute: All of the statutory provisions
71 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.15 (Supp. 1965).
71 Elsewhere, in analyzing the North Carolina provision making fiduciary duties
run to shareholders as well as to the corporation, I have suggested that such language
might well induce a court in such a jurisdiction to decide in favor of shareholders
several issues which recently have gone against them. See Folk, Revisiting the North
Carolina Corporation Law, 43 N.CJ.. REv. 768, 796-802 (1965).
"' This procedure for attaching shares of stock and requiring the director-owner
to defend the main action in Delaware is in large measure based on DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 169 (1952), which states that the situs of shares of stock in a Delaware corpo-
ration remains in Delaware. See also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 324 (Supp. 1964).
"CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-322 (Supp. 1965).
7' S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-13.7 (Supp. 1965). An earlier version of .the South Caro-
lina statute was upheld as not violative of the federal constitution in Wagenberg v.
Charleston Wood Prods., Inc., 122 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.S.C. 1954).
7 N.C. GFN. STAT. § 55-33 (1965) (adopted in 1955).
77 CAL. Cors'. CODE § 820.
7' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (1965).
70 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (1960), as amended, § 33-323 (c) (Supp. 1965).
,oN.Y. Bus. CORP. LA.w § 713.
81 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.16 (Supp. 1965).
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apply at least to transactions between a director and his corporation
and, with some variations,8 2 to transactions between a corporation
and some other entity in which a director of the corporation holds
a post or has a financial interest. Two statutes go beyond this mini-
mum. Connecticut includes transactions involving "a member of
[the director's] immediate family," whether directly with the cor-
poration or with some other entity in which a family member has
an interest.8  South Carolina's statute embraces both transactions
between a corporation and one of its officers and transactions be-
tween corporations (or other entities) with common officers.84 None
of these statutes purports to deal with non-officer personnel such as
controlling or dominant shareholders; nor does any statute specifi-
cally deal with a transaction between a corporation and a nominee
of a director or officer.8 5 However, since courts will not likely over-
look the extent to which subterfuge would defeat a salutary rule of
law, they may impose liability on nominees or others controlled by
or acting for a true insider, and perhaps also on one not technically
an officer or director but enjoying access to confidential information.
(b) Transactions Affected by Statutes: All of the statutes use
sufficiently indefinite terms, such as "transaction" or "contract," to
include all sorts of arrangements between a corporation and "inter-
ested" persons. Usually, the statutes exempt from coverage that
very important "transaction" of fixing compensation." The older
North Carolina provision stipulated a test, not adopted by later
statutes, defining "just and reasonable" compensation as "what
would be paid for such services at arm's length under competitive
conditions."8 7
(c) Statutory Tests for Validating Transactions: The heart of
these statutes-whatever transactions they cover and to whomever
they apply--comprises three disjunctive clauses, varying in language
but following an identical pattern: (1) disinterested director ap-
82 See notes 86-87 infra and accompanying text.
83 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (a) (1960). "Member of the immediate family"
means spouse, parents or children. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (d) (1) (1960).
"S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.16(b) (Supp. 1965).
"Statutes which refer to a "financial interest, direct or indirect," e.g., S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-18.16 (b) (2) (Supp. 1965), probably lend themselves more readily to sweep-
ing subterfuge arrangements.
"N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 713 (c) (absent certificate or by-law provision); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-18.16 (e) (Supp. 1965) (same). See notes 64-65 supra and accompany-
ing text.
'
T N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30(b) (8) (1965) (enacted in 1955).
[Vol. 1966: 875
Vol. 1966: 875] CORPORATION STATUTES: 1959-1966
proval, or (2) shareholder approval, or (3) proof of fairness of the
transaction.
The clause requiring disinterested director approval seeks pro-
tection in disclosure to directors and their lack of economic interest
in the transaction. New York requires authorization by disinter-
ested directors or committee members, but it is much too weak in
requiring only disclosure or knowledge of "the fact of such common
directorship, officership or financial interest.""" This contrasts with
South Carolina's forcing not only disclosure of "the material facts
as to his interest" but also those "as to the transaction."89 The
Connecticut provision is less direct since, besides mandating a dis-
interested majority to authorize a transaction, validation depends
on showing that the transaction "is not manifestly unfair as to the
corporation." 90 The South Carolina and Connecticut approaches
vary somewhat, but each is superior to New York's in not allowing
a director, in effect, to say: "I own forty-five per cent of the stock of
T Corporation with whom this contract is made," and then to keep
silent as to material features of the contract about which he alone
may know or be able sufficiently to interpret in the light of his knowl-
edge of the affairs of both contracting parties. Presumably, a statute
so limited as New York's will be judicially glossed with some require-
ment of "good faith" over and above disclosure of the fact of the
interest, although it would seem unwarranted for the court, absent
further statutory provision in this subsection, to read in a full "fair-
ness" test.
On the second requirement-shareholder approval-New York
again adopts an inadequate provision, for it requires only disclosure
of the "common directorship, officership or financial interest" and
approval by a shareholder vote.91 The same criticisms proffered
above apply here, and indeed, this statutory test which says nothing
about disclosing material facts of the transaction is less rigorous
than would be expected for common law ratification. Additionally,
unlike its director-authorization provision, New York requires no
disinterested majority of shareholders. Nor does the Connecticut
8 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (a) (1). Even the otherwise tight North Carolina
provision refers only to "knowledge on the part of the other directors." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-30 (b) (1) (1965).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.16 (a) (1) (Supp. 1965).
90 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (a) (1) (1960).
°'N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 713 (a) (2).
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statute which reaches the same result since it does not incorporate
its "manifest unfairness" test into this part of the statute.92 The
archetypal California statute does require "good faith,"93 and we
can hope that this would be read into the New York and Connecti-
cut provisions. South Carolina,94 following North Carolina,95 takes
the strictest position by requiring approval by a majority of the
disinterested shares. Presumably this provision does not readily
commend itself to other states because of its strictness and the possi-
ble administrative difficulties of determining which shares have a
disqualifying interest.
The residual test in each statute is whether the transaction is
"fair and equitable" (South Carolina), "fair and reasonable" (New
York), or just "fair" (Connecticut), as of the time of the transaction
rather than in retrospect. On this point, there is no significant
variation, except that the South Carolina statute specifically puts
the burden of so proving on the proponent of fairness, 9 who would
normally be a director or officer. There is much to be said for such
a statutory resolution of this potentially vexatious question since
courts have disagreed in the past as to whether the plaintiff (usually
the suing shareholder) must prove unfairness or whether the defen-
dant (often the director) must bear the burden of proving fairness;
the latter is preferable since the insider is better positioned to bring
to light the pertinent facts.
(d) Common Directors: Two statutes-Connecticut and South
Carolina-relax the rules for sustaining a transaction between cor-
porations with interlocking directors. Connecticut validates the
transaction either if it "is not manifestly unfair" to the corporation
which attacks it or if a majority of the voting shares have approved
it.97 South Carolina takes a different approach by requiring fair-
ness but placing the burden of proof on the party asserting unfair-
ness.98 The presumed fairness of a contract made by interlocked
boards accords with New York decisional law99 and presumably will
92 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (a) (2) (1960).
"3 CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (b).
9" S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.16 (a) (2) (Supp. 1965).
O N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30(b)(2) (1965).
"0 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.16 (a) (3) (Supp. 1965).
"7 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (b) (1960).
98 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.16 (c) (Supp. 1965).
"See Chelrob v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944); Everett v. Phillips,
288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
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carry forward under its new statute, which is silent about the bur-
dens of proof in the interlock situation.
(e) Quorum: New York100 counts interested directors towards a
quorum, while South Carolina has a like rule for determining a
quorum at both directors' and shareholders' meetings. 01 It seems
reasonable to let a directors' or shareholders' meeting organize un-
embarrassed with quorum difficulties; indeed, it might be impossi-
ble to assemble a quorum if interested directors or shares could
not be counted. Safeguards come, not through perpetually blocking
a quorum, but from requirements of full disclosure and disinter-
ested voting. And finally, as the Delaware court once observed in
a related situation, "questions of alleged unfairness or inequity"
may always be decided by the courts and will remain "untouched"
by a charter clause permitting interested directors to help make a
quorum.102
(f) Miscellaneous Points: All of the statutes apply when a direc-
tor has a "financial interest" or a "substantial interest" in the trans-
action; but only Connecticut explains this concept by enumerating
"exclusions" from a general definition.0 3 So complex is the inter-
play of the resulting definition with the rest of the statute that the
scope of the statute is elusive. Counsel should probably follow a
simple rule of advising client-directors: "When in doubt as to
whether you have any interest, disclose it and put it on the records."
New York and South Carolina do not specify the relief which
the courts may give if the transaction is declared "void or voidable."
It is assumed that rescission or perhaps director liability is in order.
Connecticut wades into this difficult matter by authorizing rescis-
sion or damages or both, properly guaranteeing that "the rights of
third parties shall be protected."10 4 Elsewhere it is stated that, if
any of the tests of validity are met, "such director shall not incur
any liability."'1 5 Does this carry a negative implication that if the
tests are not met, the director does (or may) "incur liability"? How-
ever, it does not follow that because a transaction should be re-
scinded for interest, personal liability should be incurred; and,
100 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (b).
10
" S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.16(d) (Supp. 1965).
102 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 314, 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
103 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (d) (2) (1960).
1'0 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (c) (Supp. 1965).
105 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (a) (1960).
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indeed, a leading New York decision has clearly distinguished the
two remedies. 0 6 Thus, the language seems to raise a problem which
it does not solve.
4. Number of Directors: While several states statutorily require
a minimum of three directors,107 other jurisdictions now authorize
a lesser number equal to the number of shareholders which may be
as few as one or two. 08 Wyoming, alone among these states, takes
the desirable further step of requiring the articles of incorporation
of an enterprise with a one or two-man board to specify the number
of directors if the number of shareholders should increase beyond
one or two. 0 9
The states enacting one or two-man director statutes are split
on whether to count only record or to include beneficially held
shares. Delaware, New York, and Wyoming, for example, require
that all shares be owned "beneficially and of record" by fewer than
three shareholders," 0 while Illinois and Nebraska look only to rec-
ord ownings."' Thus, if all shares were owned of record by one
natural person and by a trust with two beneficaries, Delaware would
require three directors while Illinois would accept two. The bal-
ance of convenience favors deleting the beneficial owner require-
ment since no overwhelming reason appears for exacting it. On the
contrary, the likelihood of abuse seems slight, and the exact type
of abuse flowing from so small a number of directors is not alto-
gether clear. Moreover, as the example illustrates, the Illinois ap-
proach is more flexible. It becomes possible to determine solely
from the corporate records whether the statutory conditions vali-
dating a one or two-man board are present. Even though in a close
210 See Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 42 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
07 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-302 (1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-314(a) (Supp.
1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (b) (Supp. 1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2036 (Supp.
1963); N.Y. Bus. CoP. LAW § 702 (a); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.3 (a) (Supp. 1965);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.34 (1965).
10
" The best discussion of this topic is Rudolph, Further Thoughts on the One
and Two Director Statutes, 20 Bus. LAiv. 781 (1965). I, for one, am glad to concede
Wyoming's "plaintive claim to parentage" for the one and two-director statutes, see
Rudolph, supra at 782, despite my earlier supposition that Delaware fathered the
idea, see Folk, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law Revision,
18 Bus. LAw. 351, 364 (1963). Surprisingly, the state which pioneered so much
close corporation law has never provided for less-than-three-men boards. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-25 (a) (1965).
100 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.46 (k) (1965).
:
10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (b) (Supp. 1964); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 702 (a);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-86.34 (1965). Accord, ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.185 (1965).
221 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.34 (Supp. 1965); NEu. REv. STAT. § 21-2036 (Supp.
1963).
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corporation the parties presumably know who owns the stock, it
does cause some uncertainty and may impair the reliability of cor-
porate action by a small board if one must look beyond corporate
records for facts of beneficial ownership, often concealed and other-
wise difficult to determine. Of course, the potential hardships are
allayed by the fact that outsiders ignorant of beneficial ownings
would presumably be protected in dealing with a board of a size
which appears to meet the statutory conditions. Perhaps the most
compelling reason favoring a record ownership rule is that the
validity of corporate action could otherwise be put in doubt (both
as to outsiders and insiders) by events beyond the corporation's con-
trol (or knowledge) since one shareholder could subdivide his
shareholdings and thus, unknown to the corporation, destroy com-
pliance with the statutory condition.112
It is interesting to notice that apparently no state has considered
how the statutory requirement of number and identity of officers
fits in with a one or two-man corporation. Conventionally, statutes
require, as a minimum, a treasurer, a secretary, and a president, but
they normally forbid combination of the latter two offices. 113 The
two-man corporation can readily conform. A one-man corporation
obviously cannot literally comply, but generally corporate action is
valid if taken by unanimous directors and/or shareholders, who, in
this case, would be the lone shareholder-director." 4 However, with
the single shareholder corporation it would seem desirable to elimi-
nate any requirement of offices at all or to expressly permit all
offices to be held by one person." 5
Apart from the one or two-shareholder enterprise, it might be
desirable to permit a multi-shareholder corporation to operate with
one or two directors. Two American statutes so provide,"" and the
English Companies Act authorizes a single director for a private
112 Thus, where beneficial ownings must be counted, the corporate documents
should include a type of transfer restriction to block alienations of beneficial interest
in order to avoid the clandestine transfer problem.
"13 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 44 (1953). The Nevada statute would not
bar combining all offices in one person. NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.130 (1963).
""4Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-11.4(b) (2) (D) (Supp. 1965) authorizing, as a
general principle, that documents may be executed "by the holders of all the out-
standing shares of the corporation."
115 IOWA CODE § 496A.45 (1962); PANAMA GEN. CORP. LAW art. 66.
118 IowA CODE § 496A.35 (1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.315 (1) (Supp. 1965). The
standard minimum number of directors is three. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar §
84 (1953).
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company and a minimum of two directors for other companies. 117
In some situations equally divided shareholdings may be able to
get together on a single "managing director" of the British type,
perhaps an independent outsider, rather than stymie all action with
an incompatible two-man board. In all events, the fact that such a
scheme could serve a small enterprise in some situations would itself
commend statutes which allow the extra flexibility. Whether or not
cumulative voting is mandatory or permissive in a given jurisdic-
tion should largely determine whether a statute should authorize a
one or two-man board for a corporation with more than one or two
shareholders respectively, since a two-man board in a corporation
with three or five shareholders would dilute cumulative voting.18
5. Some Technical Points Regarding Director Activities:
(a) Waivers: Statutes, including the Model Act,"19 have routine-
ly provided for notice waivers signed before or after meetings of
directors or shareholders. A more recent innovation is the provision
that attendance is of itself effective as a waiver of notice as if a
document were duly signed.120 Excepted is the director who attends
a meeting solely to make a threshold objection to transacting any
business on the ground that the meeting has not been lawfully
called or noticed, but it would follow that if his objection were
overruled, any participation in the meeting would constitute the
statutory waiver of notice.
(b) Consents: After a number of states authorized directors to
act without a meeting, the Model Act eventually tagged along.12'
Delaware provides simply that, absent contrary charter restriction,
the board or a committee may act without a meeting "if prior to
such action a written consent thereto is signed by all members of
the board" and "such written consent" is duly filed with the min-
utes.122 The Model Act, with some language changes, adopts the
same provision. Both are susceptible to two nagging technical diffi-
culties. The implication that all signatures must appear on the same
document-witness the singular term "consent" in the statutes-
27 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 176, 178.
118 More specifically, how strong is the policy favoring cumulative voting? A
three-man board in a ten-shareholder corporation would substantially dilute a cumu-
lative voting right, whether granted by statute or charter.
I19 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 137 (1953).
120E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 711 (c).
121L 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 39A (Supp. 1966) (optional provision).
22 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (g) (Supp. 1964).
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should be eliminated so that separate writings may collectively com-
prise the "written consent" to informal action. A few statutes now
so provide.123 Secondly, both the Delaware and Model Act language
authorizing consent "prior to" the action taken seemingly negates
ratification by signing consents-a needless and probably unintended
restriction.
The South Carolina 124 and North Carolina'.25 statutory provi-
sions are more liberal. Both sanction unanimous written consent
and eliminate the "prior to" language, but both still seem to require
signing a single document. However, both statutes also authorize
informal action by a majority if all directors own all shares and all
know of and none objects to the action taken, or if all shareholders
know and none objects, or if a custom of informal action is known
generally to shareholders and all directors know of and none objects
to the action taken. These generous provisions chiefly aid close
corporations and have less utility for larger enterprises than do the
Model Act and Delaware clauses authorizing unanimous written
consents.
26
(c) Director Committees: While most statutes follow the Model
Act, 27 which permits executive (or other) committees only if the
articles or by-laws so provide, it would be preferable to authorize
such committees directly if, as, and when desired. 28 Of course, the
usual limits on delegation and responsibility of the full board would
remain unaffected, as would any statutory restraints on the powers
which could be delegated. 129 Most statutory provisions for informal
director action also apply to committees as well1. 0 Several statutes
anticipate that absence or disqualification of one or more members
may postpone making a quorum or taking action, and authorize
advance designation of alternate members who automatically sit
for an absent member.' 3 ' Finally, two statutes' 32 have authorized
the establishment of all types of committees to negate any implica-
123MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28.4(7) (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.340(2)
(Supp. 1965).
, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.12 (Supp. 1965).
1
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-29 (1965).
12Arkansas deleted its former permission for directors to vote by proxy. ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 64-301 (1966).
1273 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 38 (1960).
128 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (c) (Supp. 1964).
120 E.g., 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 38 (1960); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712.
120 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 39A (Supp. 1966).
1 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRn. LAw § 712 (b).
12 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.63 (A) (Page 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.36 (1957).
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tion that only an executive committee may be formed-undoubtedly
a groundless fear.
6. Director Vacancies and Removal: Statutes vary widely on
handling board vacancies. Many jurisdictions now expressly allow
less than a quorum of directors to fill vacancies. 133 Wyoming and
Arkansas have valuable provisions for a close corporation which is
unfortunate enough to find itself without any directors because of
simultaneous death, resignation, or similar contingency and author-
ize any shareholder or the personal representative of a deceased
shareholder to call a meeting to fill the vacancy.13 4 Until recently,
it was conventional to authorize directors to fill all vacancies other
than those resulting from newly created directorships. 35 However,
a 1962 Model Act amendment and several recent statutes now per-
mit directors to create new posts and fill them until the next elec-
tion of directors by the shareholders' 36-a procedure which lends
itself to board packing and diminishes the efficacy of minority board
representation, albeit temporarily.
There is equally wide variation on removing directors. 3 7 The
new Massachusetts act marks an advance by specifically providing
that "a director or officer may be removed for cause only after a
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before the body pro-
posing to remove him.' 138 Apparently, most statutes take the posi-
tion that a director elected by cumulative voting may not be re-
moved, either with or without cause, if the votes against removal
would be enough to elect him.139 While this is certainly correct
for removal without cause, it is less clear that a director should be
immunized from removal for cause simply because he was elected
by cumulated votes.' 40 No doubt, the fear is that "cause" will be
trumped up and rashly adopted by the hostile majority sharehold-
ers; but with a statute requiring proof of cause, and assuming that
183 E.g, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 705 (a).
13
, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.35 (1965); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 64-303 (B) (1966).
11 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-317 (d) (2) (Supp. 1965).
18 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 36 (1960, Supp. 1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-
303 (A) (1966); IoWA CODE § 496A.37 (1962); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 705 (a).
237ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 36A (1953).
138 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 51 (Supp. 1965). This legislation codifies
results which two courts reached without statutory aid. Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36
Del. Ch. 563, 575-76, 134 A.2d 852, 859-60 (Ch. 1957); Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y.
427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).13 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 706 (c) (1).
"'See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957); 71 HARy.
L. REv. 1154-57 (1958).
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courts will review proven "cause" for adequacy, the director sought
to be removed has adequate protection against arbitrary action. No
statute has so far dealt with the holding of Essential Enterprises
Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc. 41 that a member of a stag-
gered board may not be removed except for cause. New York allows
directors to remove a board member for cause if the charter or a
shareholder-adopted by-law permits it,142 while Massachussets vests
removal power in the directors unless the charter or by-laws provide
to the contrary. 43 Most new statutes adequately protect directors
chosen by stock classes, 144 and New York, always seeking complete
coverage, extends this to series within classes and to bondholders
entitled to choose directors. 4 5
7. Directors' By-Law Powers: While practical considerations dic-
tate some, perhaps much, director control over by-laws, the diffi-
culties lie in defining the existence and extent of concurrent share-
holder powers. The Delaware statute46 reposes the power in the
shareholders absent delegation to the directors by the certificate of
incorporation-a delegation for which the certificate will usually pro-
vide. The Model Act 47 and several very recent statutes 48 specifically
vest by-law power in the directors absent partial or total reserva-
tion to the shareholders. The effect on shareholders of delegation,
either by charter or by statute, is sufficiently uncertain to make it
desirable to clarify the allocation of this power. Judicial authority
is wavering and uncertain; while Rogers v. Hill1 49 supposedly recog-
nized continuing concurrent power despite delegation to the direc-
tors, the New Jersey statute it involved contained a clause saving
shareholder power to amend director-made by-laws.'8 0 There is, of
course, an ill-defined judicial power to pass on the "reasonableness"
of by-laws,' 51 and the SEC proxy rules, as construed in the Trans-
1,139 Del. Ch. 93, 159 A.2d 288 (Ch. 1960).
142 N.Y. Bus. Cotp,. LAw § 706 (a).
143 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 51 (Supp. 1965).
',"E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.7(b) (1) (Supp. 1965).
1" N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 706 (c) (2).
148 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (a) (Supp. 1964).
1, 7 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 25 (1953).
148 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-513 (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.24 (1965).
2, 289 U.S. 582, 588.89 (1933).
1 0NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-2 (1939).
15 See, e.g., State ex rel. Brumlet v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 24 Del. (1
Boyce) 379, 389, 77 Atl. 16, 20 (1910); In the Matter of Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n of
Delaware, 41 Del. Ch. 369, 375-76, 195 A.2d 759, 764-65 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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america case, 52 should afford some sort of a safety-valve for share-
holders. An outright statutory grant of by-law power to the directors
arguably means total and irrevocable delegation (apart from a
charter amendment which would first have to be endorsed by the
directors), even more than a statutory clause vesting by-law power in
shareholders subject to delegation to directors. The needed safe-
guard is a clause reserving concurrent power in the shareholders.
Several of the recent statutes so provide, 1 3 while others go even
further in regulating the types of by-laws which directors may
make. 54 In all events, there does seem to be a subtle shift in the
direction of consolidating by-law control ever more firmly in exclu-
sive control of the directors.155
8. Indemnification of Directors and Officers: During the 1959-
1966 period, statutory revisions invariably authorized indemnifica-
tion of directors and officers, but no marked trends have developed,
either to tighten or liberalize corporate practices in this area. For
the most part, the alterations have been technical and have reflected
a better understanding among draftsmen of this complex field. The
statutes have continued to manifest the sharp division of opinion
which had emerged much earlier. Most revisions adopted the Model
Act provision (as reformulated in 1959) broadly empowering cor-
porations to indemnify directors and officers.'5 New York' 57 adopted
:i SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).
1 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-306 (b) (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 601 (a). The Connecticut statute has an interesting provision that the initial by-
laws "shall be deemed to have been adopted by shareholders." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-306(b) (Supp. 1965).
I.' E.g., NEB. RaV. STAT. § 21-2026 (Supp. 1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.1 (Supp.
1965). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16 (1965).
1 1 It is an interesting question for speculation as to whether a proposed amend-
ment to by-laws would be a "proper subject" for shareholder action under a Model
Act-type statute conferring all by-law powers on the directors with none reserved
to the shareholders. Would the Transamerica case have been decided the same way
if the law of the jurisdiction so provided? At the other extreme, note the North
Carolina provision, apparently unique among American statutes, providing that "any
matter relating to the affairs of a corporation is a proper subject for action at an
annual meeting of shareholders." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-61 (d) (1965); see notes 277-81
infra and accompanying text.
'rO 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. § 4 (o) (1960). The Model Act was in turn
copied initially from DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953). Post-1959 revisions
adopting Model Act language without major change are IowA CODE § 496A.4 (15)
(1962); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5309-04 (o) (Supp. 1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2004 (15) (Supp.
1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(o) (Supp. 1965); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.020
(15) (Supp. 1965) (effective July 1, 1967); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.4(o) (1965); S.D.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 22, § 4 (15). MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (Supp. 1965)
adopts the substance of the Model Act but with different wording. The Alabama
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a characteristically detailed and thorough regulation which treated
many problems unresolved in earlier statutes. Arkansas' 58 and South
Carolina 59 followed the older California6 0 and North Carolina 161
pattern of placing indemnification wholly or partly under court
control, while Connecticut took an intermediate position.1 62
(a) Persons Covered: Directors and officers, including incumbent
and former personnel, are, as always, the chief beneficiaries of in-
demnification statutes. Several statutes have added personal repre-
sentatives of indemnifiable individuals.16 3 Most statutes have fol-
lowed the Model Act's coverage of executive personnel of
subsidiaries, although linguistic variations may subject the provisions
to different interpretations. Thus, the Model Act and its progeny
refer to directors and officers of another corporation in which the
indemnifying company owns shares or has a creditor interest,1'
while Connecticut, New York, and South Carolina simply indemnify
one serving at the "request" of the corporation seeking to award
indemnity."6 5
Model Act-type statutes which refer only to "directors and offi-
cers" cast doubt on the applicable legal standards for indemnifying
executive personnel who are nevertheless not technically "officers"
under statute, charter, or by-laws. Presumably, common law rules' 66
would remain in force on the reasonable assumption that the statute
does not pre-empt the entire field. However, statutes have variously
responded to the issue. Thus, Connecticut specifically includes "em-
ployees' 167 while New York expressly declares that its provisions
"shall [not] affect any rights to indemnification to which corporate
personnel other than directors and officers may be entitled by con-
revision of 1959 contains no indemnification provision. See ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21 (56)
(Supp. 1965).
27 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 721-26.
58 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (1966).
12O S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18 (Supp. 1965).
200 CAL. CORP. CODE § 830.
261N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-19 to -21 (1965).
102 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (Supp. 1965).
163 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§§ 722-23.
20 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4 (o) (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (10)
(1953).
161 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (d) (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723 (a)
("third party" suits); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18 (a) (Supp. 1965).
"G See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 438-40 (1958).
167CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320(b) (Supp. 1965).
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tract or otherwise under law."168 Connecticut follows North Caro-
lina in defining "employee" to include "any person who is engaged
to perform services for the corporation, whether as independent
contractor or otherwise."' 69 Connecticut also includes controlling
shareholders within its indemnity provision by defining "officer"
to include "any person who has legal power, directly or indirectly,
to elect a majority of the board of directors of the corporation."1 0
(b) Indemnifiable Proceedings: It may well be that early statutes
were drawn with derivative suits chiefly in mind. At least, some
statutes could not readily accommodate desired indemnification of
actions by "third parties," that is, "actions or proceedings other than
[ones] by or in the right of the corporation."'' The Model Act and
other recent statutes clearly cover third-party civil actions.172
However, after Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.178
construed the phrase "action, suit or proceeding" in the then New
York statute to exclude criminal cases, statutes, including the Model
Act,'74 were soon amended to insure this coverage, which became
increasingly vital, particularly to executives defending antitrust pro-
ceedings. Thus, the Model Act altered its only explicit limitation
on a corporation's indemnity power to bar payments to any director
or officer who had been "adjudged ... liable for negligence or mis-
conduct in the performance of his duty to the corporation .... "175
New York, of course, permits indemnity in third-party actions, but
its approach is much more refined and precise. 76
Administrative proceedings are usually construed as falling with-
in the conventional statutory language, 1 7 although an occasional
jurisdiction makes doubly sure by expressly so providing. 78 If the
proceedings are purely investigative, it is, however, possible that
indemnity might not be allowed, not because an investigation is
not a proceeding (it clearly is), but because the statute is keyed to
168 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 721.
109 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 88-320 (a) (Supp. 1965) with N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-19(b) (1965).170 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 88-320 (a) (Supp. 1965).
171 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723 (section title).
172 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 4 (O) (1960).
1 805 N.Y. 895, 118 N.E.2d 583 (1953).
37 The Model Act was revised in 1959.
175 8 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 4 (o) (1960). (Emphasis added.)
178 See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
177 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. § 4 (O), 8.02 (2) (1960, Supp. 1966).1 R.I. GEN. LANWs ANN. § 7-9-12 (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.04(14) (Supp. 1966).
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expenses incurred in the "defense" of the action or proceeding.
Since the term has at most a Pickwickian meaning in a mere investi-
gation, the statutes purporting to indemnify only expenses of a
"defense" may not cover this situation, although at least one court
has authorized such indemnity.17 9 A similar uncertainty as to the
scope of indemnification provisions exists as to expenses incurred
in an arbitration proceeding.
Indeed, this difficulty raises the basic question whether indemni-
fication should necessarily be limited to costs of "defense." It may
well be appropriate for a director to recover expenses of a suit
in which he seeks a declaratory judgment, but the "defense" lan-
guage could block indemnity. So, too, in complicated litigation
involving cross-claims and counterclaims, a court, bound by the
"defense" language of the statute, may be in the ridiculous position
of allocating legal expense between the director's multiple role as
defendant and as counter or cross-claimant. Even if a director
should recover the costs of raising his shield, the expenses of aggres-
sively wielding his sword should, as a general rule, be his and not
the corporation's. However, statutes might well grant corporations
or courts a discretionary power to award indemnification in the
occasional situation where action as a plaintiff has demonstrably
benefited the corporation as well as the individual.
(c) "Expenses": In practically all recent statutes, indemnifiable
"expenses" have been expanded to include attorney's fees. Most
statutes, expressly or by implication, and subject to more or less
regulation, authorize recovery of judgments, fines (whether on con-
viction or on nolo contendere pleas), penalties, and amounts paid
in settlement of an action. A subtle change is also indicated in the
Model Act's switch from its pre-1957 test of "expenses actually and
necessarily" incurred'80 to the present test, frequently found in the
newer revisions,18' covering "expenses actually and reasonably" in-
1'' Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 589-90, 64 A.2d
581, 607 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (sustaining indemnity for expenses incurred by officer in
SEC investigation which was "ultimately dosed to .the satisfaction of the corporation').
180 This is at present the standard in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (10) (1953).
181 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (b) (Supp. 1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18
(b) (1) (Supp. 1965). Manning, The 1961 Amendments to the Connecticut Corporation
Acts, 35 CONN. B.J. 460 (1961), noted that it is "extremely difficult to make out a
case that particular past expenses were 'necessary,'" and viewed the change to expenses
"actually" incurred as "notable." Id. at 466. But cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 722 (a),
723 (a) ("reasonable expenses . . . actually and necessarily incurred').
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curred.182
(d) Indemnity Standards and Controls-Third-Party Actions: As
indicated, judgments, fines, penalties, and amounts paid in settle-
ments in third-party actions are usually recoverable. The statutes
vary in the controls and standards for such recovery.18 3
Indemnification by Corporation: Prior to 1960, North Carolina
had authorized the unsuccessful director to recover if a plan for
payment was approved by a majority of voting shares excluding
those held by the indemnitee18 4 California in 1957 abandoned its
earlier view requiring court approval of all indemnification and
authorized reimbursement upon the directors' determination "in
good faith" that the indemnitee had acted "within what he reason-
ably believed to be the scope of his employment or authority and
for a purpose which he reasonably believed to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation or its shareholders."'' 5 The Model Act con-
tinued to employ its loose and vague standard of barring from
indemnity only one who was "adjudged . . . liable for negligence
or misconduct in the performance of duty to the corporation," but
then it seemingly restored what it had withdrawn by recognizing
in the last sentence "any other indemnification" authorized by the
articles, by-laws, or resolution of the shareholders "after notice."1 86
On the one hand, this language arguably supersedes the "adjudged
liable" restriction, in which case it is surely improper without some
controls; but on the other hand it may only preserve common law
rights to indemnity over and above what the Model Act empowers
the corporation to make, in which case the provision is poorly
drafted.
New York alone distinguishes the divergent issues involved in
indemnifying civil and criminal suits and meets the problem of
indemnitees voting on their own indemnity. For civil actions, re-
1823 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 4 (o) (1960).
1s.See notes 171-79 and accompanying text supra.
8" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-20 (3) (1965). If "successful in his defense on the merits,"
the indemnitee is "entitled" to reimbursement, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55.20 (1) (1965);
if "wholly successful otherwise than solely on the merits," the directors, without
regard to adverse interests, could vote indemnification, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55.20(2)
(1965). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (D) (1966) follows North Carolina almost verbatim
on the corporation's power to indemnify "successful" directors, but has no provision,
corresponding to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-20 (3) (1965), for indemnity in "unsuccessful"
third-party actions.1 85 CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 ().
1 883 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 4 (o) (1960).
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covery may be had by an unsuccessful director or officer who, it is
shown, "acted in good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation."'81 7 A director
or officer criminally convicted must also prove that he "had no
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful."'8,, That
the statute sharply distinguishes the standards for indemnification
from the substantive grounds of the criminal action appears from
a further provision that an unfavorable disposition of the case does
not of itself preclude the director's meeting the indemnification
standards' 89-a conclusion implicit in the statutory language. Thus,
a convicted price fixer might show conduct in the corporation's
supposed best interests (indeed, the company may have made a
whopping profit during the period of indulgence) but it is doubtful,
given present antitrust concepts, that a court would agree that he
"had no reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlaw-
ful."190
Besides these standards, New York imposes certain procedural
controls. Complete success on the merits of the action entitles the
indemnitee to recover presumably by a simple vote of the direc-
tors' 9' and clearly on a court order. 9 2 Indemnification in other
cases requires approval by a disinterested quorum of directors98
or by a vote of the shareholders (apparently without disqualifying
interested shares), 94 on finding that the statutory standards have
been met. The novelty here is that, absent a disinterested director
quorum and a desire not to go to the shareholders, the board may
indemnify "upon the opinion in writing of independent legal coun-
sel that indemnification is proper in the circumstances because the
applicable standard of conduct . . . has been met by such director
or officer."' 95 As against a further public washing of dirty linen
incident to convincing shareholders to award indemnity, it would
be foolish to suppose that directors will not prefer a private and
18 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 723 (a).
188 Ibid.
210 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 723 (b).
10 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18 (b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1965) requires only a court finding
that the individual "fairly and equitably merits indemnification."
10" N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 724 (a).
102 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 725 (a).
103 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 724(b) (1).
104 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 724(b) (2) (B).
105 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW 724 (b) (2) (A).
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discreet opinion of counsel; 196 and it would be ungenerous to sup-
pose that most counsel will fail to speak impartially.
Indemnification by Courts: Since the Model Act provision is
solely an "empowering" statute, it recognizes no "rights" to indem-
nity. At the opposite extreme, South Carolina recognizes a "right"
in the sense of judicial discretion to aid even an unsuccessful direc-
tor or officer who "fairly and equitably merits indemnification." 197
New York also authorizes court-ordered indemnity despite a con-
trary resolution of the directors or shareholders. 19 This seems sound
in the case of a director who may have been ousted after a proxy
fight and refused any indemnity for expenses in earlier litigation,
no matter how deserving he may have been.199
(e) Indemnity Standards and Controls-Adjudications in Deriva-
tive Actions: Although indemnification of expenses in third-party,
especially governmental, actions poses difficult problems of under-
cutting public policy-problems not recognized by any of the statutes
-indemnity in derivative actions can equally subvert effective en-
forcement of fiduciary duties. In the extreme case, a director's
recovery of expenses and judgments in a derivative suit which he
has lost would deprive the corporation of its adjudicated recovery
and entail the added loss of the director's expenses. Accordingly,
the recent statutes continue the established rule, variously stated,
that indemnity cannot be granted if the director breached his duty
to the corporation.
Indemnification by Corporation: Here most of the new revisions
follow the Model Act in forbidding indemnification if the director
has been "adjudged . . liable" for breach of duty to the corpora-
tion.200 Although New York uses the same test,20 1 it regulates cor-
196 However, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 726 (c) in effect requires in such cases that
the shareholders be duly and promptly notified as to the "persons paid, the amounts
paid, and the nature and status at the time of such payment of the litigation or
threatened litigation."
197 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18.18 (b) (1) (B), (b) (2) (Supp. 1965).
199 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 725 (a).
199 Occasionally, a corporate by-law will be more restrictive than the statute. See
Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (Ch. 1962).
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 726 (b) (2) recognizes the effectiveness of a charter or by-law
clause more restrictive than the statute if in effect at the time the alleged cause of
action accrued.
0093 MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 4(o) (1960). In Connecticut indemnity is barred
if the indemnitee has been "finally adjudged . . . to be liable for negligence or
misconduct in the performance of his duties." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (b)
(Supp. 1965).
201 N.Y. Bus. CoP. LAw § 722 (a).
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porate action in granting'permissible indemnity by requiring here,
as in the case of indemnity for third-party suits, a disinterested
quorum of directors, action by the shareholders, or an opinion of
independent counsel.2 0 2 Connecticut also bars indemnity to those
"finally adjudged" liable20 3 and authorizes indemnity only if the
indemnitee has been "successful in his defense on the merits" or if
the court has awarded indemnity.204
Indemnification by Courts: Arkansas follows the earlier Califor-
nia and North Carolina statutes permitting indemnity in derivative
actions only on a court finding that the indemnitee was successful
in whole or in part in the parent suit, and that his conduct "fairly
and equitably merits" the recovery he seeks.205 South Carolina de-
letes the first condition so that the court's power to indemnify under
a "fair and equitable" standard is measurably broader. 206 New York
authorizes judicial award of indemnity, but the court's power is
limited by the same standards applicable to the corporation,207 al-
though it would seem sensible to allow courts a wider discretion in
the matter than could properly be entrusted to the corporation.
20 8
Indemnity for Unsuccessful Defendants: It may be questioned
whether indemnification should invariably be withheld from an
officer or director who has violated his duty to the corporation.
Despite easy statement of the general fiduciary duty, and given the
gradual and sometimes unpredictable evolution of sound ethical
standards into rules of law, it does not necessarily follow that every
director who is "adjudged liable" for breach of duty or who is not
"successful in whole or in part" should invariably lose an indem-
nification right. This would be especially true in some borderline
case of conduct which is held for the first time in a particular
jurisdiction to constitute a breach of duty. For example, it took
some time to reach any definite conclusion on the general contours
of a director's right to use corporate funds to buy the corporation's
202N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 724(b).
20CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320(b) (Supp. 1965).
204 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (C) (Supp. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
2051ARx. STAT. ANN. § 64-309(A) (1966); CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(a)(2); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-21 (a) (2) (1965).
206 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18 (b) (1) (B), (b) (2) (Supp. 1965).
207 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 725.
208 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (c) (Supp. 1965) is broader since success on
the merits and a judicial finding that indemnity would be "not reasonable or in-
equitable" are alternative tests.
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own shares to avoid a shift of corporate control; so, too, with the
development in Delaware of the law governing stock options.
Clearly, indemnification in such cases is a most delicate matter,
and equally clearly it is not something to be left entirely to directors
(interested or disinterested) or to shareholders to determine. Yet,
as standards of business ethics are translated into rules of law, there
may be instances where the risk of loss-especially the risk resulting
from a new decision-should rest on the corporation. The British
Companies Act so recognizes. Section 448 (1) provides that although
an officer of the corporation has been found liable for "negligence,
default, breach of duty or breach of trust"-serious wrongs all-the
court may nevertheless relieve him in whole or in part from person-
al liability "on such terms as the court may think fit," on a finding
that the individual "acted honestly and reasonably, and that, having
regard to all the circumstances of the case . . . he ought fairly to
be excused" from bearing personal liability.20 9 It is then provided
that if the court order relieves any such individual from personal
liability, he "shall be indemnified out of the assets of the com-
pany. '210 While this poses a rather subtle distinction between hon-
orable and dishonorable, reasonable and unreasonable, breaches of
duty, it is not beyond the resources of the courts to make this
discrimination.211
The fact that one may not, indeed should not, sympathize with
the insider who has cut the line too close is not relevant other than
as an outlet for pent-up emotions. Actually, several rational grounds
suport a role of judicial discretion on this issue, bearing always in
mind that such indemnity should never be awarded by corporate
act and that if so done the amounts should be recoverable from any
one participating in the award. First, a new rule of fiduciary duty
can be evolved more readily and declared more boldly if the court
can, in an appropriate case, grant indemnity in whole or in part
for conduct concededly unethical but not legally wrong at the time,
209 Companies Act, 1948, 11 9& 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 448 (1).
210 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 136. (Emphasis added.)
"I The South Carolina statute after stating a general test for indemnification,
authorizes it if "notwithstanding the . . . limitations [stated in the general test],
the court finds that the person sued fairly and equitably merits indemnification."
S.C. CODa ANN. § 12-18.18(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1965). Thus, it might be wise for the
director-defendant to apply for indemnification in the proceeding in which his
liability is being adjudicated. The court's discretion under the South Carolina statute
would permit substantially the same results as the English Companies Act.
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and thereby avoid a heavy judgment retrospectively imposed upon
an individual for the first time. This aids the court caught be-
tween the Scylla of holding no breach of duty under existing law,
and the Charybdis of exacting a possible crushing personal liability
for disregarding an ethical concept which was not then but should
now be a legal standard. It is also arguable that the money judg-
ments which usually (though not inevitably) accompany a newly
declared duty may be more appropriately borne by the entire enter-
prise than by the individual who has gone too far, perhaps on legal
advice. Again, it is relevant that the risk may be insurable, within
limits, under directors' indemnification insurance policies which are
often purchased by corporations. Finally, a mere variation in the'
factual application of an established rule ought not alone induce a
court to award indemnity out of a kindly heart to a "guilty" direc-
tor. A roughly formulated distinction might be the following: if a
court pronounces a new doctrine or concept of duty which cannot
reasonably be said to have been anticipated at the time of the acts
done by responsible and conservative counsel as a legal rule in con-
trast to an ethical standard, the cost may in an appropriate case be
properly assessed against the corporation. Actual dishonesty, fraud,
or wilful misconduct ought, of course, to be excepted. All in all
the occasions for meeting these tough problems will probably be
few. Although it may sometimes mean that a disreputable insider
"gets by," yet if the way is opened for consolidating higher stan-
dards of conduct by inviting what are in effect prospective rules of
law, the occasional price is well paid.
(f) Indemnity Standards and Controls-Settlements of Derivative
Actions: Although indemnifying expenses in settled as well as ad-
judicated derivative actions may undercut effective enforcement of
fiduciary duties, there is a further policy dimension to indemnifica-
tion of settlements. Directors should be encouraged to litigate
groundless claims against them and thereby vindicate both them-
selves and the corporation.212 Indemnification liberally awarded
after judicial vindication but withheld after settlement implements
that policy. Stated otherwise, indemnification of settled claims not
susceptible to a probable successful defense will subvert enforcement
of duties. Such indemnification would also encourage strike suits,
212 See Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 371,
379, 164 A.2d 437, 441-42 (Ch. 1960); Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 272,
19 A.2d 344, 347.48 (Ch. 1941).
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since directors might be more willing to compromise at corporate
expense, thereby inviting disreputable shareholders to sue and force
a costly buy-out.213 On the other hand, a fixed and immutable rule
against indemnification of expenses in all settled actions would con-
travene the strong policies favoring settlement. For example, judi-
cial power to order indemnity in connection with a court-approved
settlement of a derivative action would generally safeguard corpo-
rate interests and fairly treat the director or officer who has secured
a favorable settlement, but indemnity in these situations should be
allowable only if the court approves it.
The Model Act and its progeny apparently allow indemnity in
connection with any settled derivative suit, whether or not approved
by a court.2 14 This conclusion follows from the fact that the "ad-
judged liable" limitation does not apply to a settlement, and also
from the draftsmen's somewhat dubious view that the term "ex-
penses" includes the amount of a settlement.215 The Model Act
approach would be to allow indemnity for any amount "actually
and reasonably incurred" in settling the action, subject neither to
court or statutorily required intracorporate controls nor to disclo-
sure requirements.26
Fortunately, other states have adopted an approach less tainted
by an obviously excessive deference to management self-interest.
Arkansas, like the pre-1959 California and North Carolina statutes,
authorizes court-ordered indemnity of settlement "expenses" on
showing (1) that the suit was settled with court approval217 or that
the indemnitee was "successful in whole or in part ... in any settle-
ment" of the action against him218 and (2) that his conduct "fairly
and equitably" merits indemnity.29 Since the statutes refer to "ex-
penses of defense," it is unclear whether the settlement sum itself
213 Indeed, it would be "unhealthy" to "place a director in the position where
he would be assured of indemnification if he settled but would run the risk of paying
his own attorney if he unsuccessfully risked the action." Essential Enterprises Corp.
v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 351, 182 A.2d 647, 652 (Ch. 1962).
21"43 MODEL Bus. CoKI. Aar § 4(o) (1960).
21
r See 1 MODFL Bus. Come. AcT ANN. § 4 (o), 4.03 (1960).
216 The second clause of the Model Act provision authorizes indemnity by share-
holder-adopted by-law or resolution "after notice." 3 MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN.
§ 4(o) (1960).
217 CAL. CoR. CoDE § 830 (a) (1).
2 18 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-21 (a) (1) (1965); accord, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (A) (1)
(1966).2 29 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (A) (2) (1966); CAL. CoR. CODE § 830 (a) (2); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-21 (a) (2) (1965).
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is indemnifiable. South Carolina adopts the California formulation
but prescribes that the indemnity may include the settlement sum
as well as the expenses of the action.220 Since all three would ex-
clude settlements not approved by the court, presumably payments
could be recovered from the indemnitee and from those who in-
demnified him contrary to the terms of the statute. The New York
statute apparently bars any indemnity for the settlement sum, even
if the settlement has court approval,221 and permits indemnity of
expenses only if the settlement has court approval.222 Thus, New
York appears to adopt the most restrictive test of all for indemnity
in connection with settled derivative actions.
(g) Miscellaneous Provisions on Indemnification: Only a few
points remain to be noted. New York properly bars indemnity for
"expenses incurred in defending" and "amounts paid in settling or
otherwise disposing of a threatened action," 223 thereby eliminating
the incentive for a director to buy out a strike (or other) suit know-
ing or expecting to be repaid. An advance, or at least a novelty, is
another New York provision authorizing indemnity of expenses
before final judgment, subject to approval by a disinterested board,
the shareholders, or an opinion of independent counsel;224 but the
indemnitee must repay any amounts advanced to which he is ulti-
mately found not to be entitled.
225
Several statutes have dealt with the exclusiveness of the statutory
indemnity provisions. The Model Act, of course, leaves the matter
wholly uncertain, first by empowering the corporation to indemnify
except when the indemnitee has been "adjudged liable" for breach
of duty, and then by sweepingly authorizing "any other indemnifi-
cation" recognized by the articles, or by any shareholder-adopted
by-law, or resolution, without, however, repeating the "adjudged
liable" standard. In short, it is vaguely all-inclusive, not to mention
wretchedly drafted. New York, the Carolinas, and California all
make their statutes exclusive.226 Connecticut, while not explicit,
220 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18 (b) (2) (Supp. 1965).
221 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. Iwv § 722 (b) (1).
222 N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAw § 722 (b) (2).
223 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 722 (b).
22' N.Y. Bus. Coat. LAw § 724 (c).
2, N.Y. Bus CoRP. LAW § 726 (a). In connection with its exclusive procedure for
court-ordered indemnity derivative suits, Arkansas specifically provides that "any
shareholder may appear in opposition to such indemnification." ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-309(B) (1966).
226 N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAw § 721; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-19 (a) (1965); S.C. CODE ANN.
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seemingly pre-empts the field.227 Certainly, it is better to adopt a
fair and comprehensive statute proscribing indemnification incon-
sistent with its terms, than to open the door for types of indemnity
which may violate sound policy. The ease with which secret under-
the-table deals can slip by even the strictest laws is sufficiently great
that statutes should not be written so as to facilitate their nefarious
objectives.
III. SHAREHOLDERS: MEETINGS AND VOTING
The post-1959 statutes have generally developed only a few un-
usual provisions on shareholder meetings and voting, adhering in
the main to the Model Act pattern with some modifications and
added detail. Since the subject matter is well known, this part of
the article culls out only a few of the noteworthy provisions for
discussion, consciously risking a distorted picture by concentrating
on distinctive and odd features.
1. Quorum: It is, of course, commonplace for statutes to author-
ize greater-than-majority quorum and vote requirements at share-
holder meetings, chiefly to serve the peculiar needs of close corpora-
tions. While quorums may usually be fixed as high as desired, they
are customarily limited on the down-side by the Model Act require-
ment of a minimum of one-third of the shares entitled to vote at
the meeting.228 A few statutes bar any such reduced proportion 220
on the theory that since a majority of the votes usually controls
action at shareholder meetings, a minimum quorum of one-third
means that crucial shareholder action may be taken by as little as
one-sixth of the shares entitled to vote (or perhaps less if all shares
present do not vote). The most surprising provision is Iowa's ex-
plicit authorization of any proportion less than a majority of the
shares entitled to vote at the meeting.2 0 An unofficial comment
indicates that the Iowa corporation law revision committee specifi-
cally intended for the articles to define the quorum in any way the
incorporators wished, however small it might be. The proffered
§ 12-18.18(d) (Supp. 1965); CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(e). See also ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-309(E) (1966).
:27 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (Supp. 1965).
228 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 30 (1953). In the absence of a reduced
percentage provided for by the articles of incorporation, the Model Act requires a
majority of the shares entitled to vote. Ibid.
29 E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.8 (a) (Supp. 1965).
2Io010VA CODE § 496A.31 (1962).
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defense of this strange provision is that since some local corporations
have "several hundred or even several thousand shareholders with
a limitation that no one may own more than one share," even a
one-third quorum would "make it difficult or impossible for some
of these corporations ever to hold a meeting."'23' Assuming argu-
endo that this is accurate as to some corporations, such as rural tele-
phone companies, the obvious solution is to stipulate a special
quorum rule for such enterprises, as at least two other states have
done.23 2 Instead, the Iowa statute authorizes any corporation, what-
ever its size or its number or distribution of shareholders and
whether or not its special needs demand unique rules, to adopt a
dangerous charter provision. Any layman can readily see that a
corporation dominated by, say, a twenty per cent block of stock, need
only fix a twenty per cent shareholder quorum and thereafter, with
the aid of some other statutory provisions, need never fear God,
man, or the courts.233
2. Vote Required: Another remarkable provision is Iowa's de-
viation from the conventional but sound rule that at a meeting at
which a quorum is present, a majority of shares-whether stated as
a majority of votes cast,234 or of the shares represented at the meet-
ing235-will be decisive.2 36 Most states authorize a greater-than-ma-
jority rule, but, with the exception of Iowa, none seems to have
embraced the view that, "whenever ... the articles of incorporation
require the vote or concurrence of the holders of a . .. lesser pro-
portion of the shares, or of any class or series thereof, than required
221 Comment, IowA CODE ANN. § 469A.31, at 801 (1962).
232 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 2211 (twenty per cent of the shareholders is a quorum for
mutual water company); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 851.267 (1) (Supp. 1965) (for rural tele-
phone companies, five per cent of shares is a quorum); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.29
(1965) (ten per cent shareholder quorum for corporations with more than 100 share-
holders none of whom has more than one vote).
2 32 Regrettably some other statutes, while not so blatant as Iowa, are vague on
reducing a statutory quorum of a majority. Usually, this comes from stating the
majority quorum rule along with a phrase "unless otherwise provided .... ." Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 17-86.29 (1965). Arguably, then, any percentage will do if the articles
so state. However, since this statute is simply the Model Act language with the final
clause preserving a minimum quorum of one-third, it looks rather as if the draftsmen
wished to authorize super-statutory quorums ("unless otherwise provided') but bar
less-than-statutory quorums. For an explicit provision, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.8 (a)
(Supp. 1965).
234 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoR. LAW § 614(b).
235 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-329 (b) (1960).
230A few states, influenced by New York, more precisely speclfy a plurality rule
for electing directors. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 614(a); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-915 (d)
(1961); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.10 (a) (2) (Supp. 1965).
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by this Act with respect to such action, the provisions of the articles
of incorporation shall control."23 7 Since no down-side limits are
stated, nothing in the statute precludes a corporation from taking
corporate action with a minority of votes cast. One can play a
fascinating game of making out various combinations and permuta-
tions with the low quorum and the low vote provisions of this
statute. And, indeed, the game has even more interesting possibili-
ties when one mixes in two additional ingredients: (1) that a con-
trolled corporation may vote shares which it owns in a controlling
corporation, if its articles so permit,238 and (2) that "nothing in
this chapter shall prohibit a corporation in its articles of incorpora-
tion from limiting or denying the right to vote by proxy."' ' 9 Coupled
with a provision initially inserted in the articles of incorporation
requiring a relatively high vote to amend out one or more such
provisions already included in the articles, shareholders can be legal-
ly disfranchised. Entrepreneurs need no longer look to other more
"liberal" American jurisdictions, or to Panama or Curacao, for in-
corporation provisions guaranteeing maximum "flexibility"-that
idol before which some corporate lawyers and some corporate-law
draftsmen do deep obeisance.
3. Informal Action and Written Consents: The more recent re-
visions and amendments exhibit a cautious trend towards allowing
non-unanimous shareholder action without a meeting, thus moving
away from the hitherto accepted view that such "informal" action
must be taken by all of the shareholders. New York first states the
conventional requirement and then validates a certificate of incor-
poration, otherwise consistent with law, authorizing "the written
consent of the holders of less than all outstanding shares" to take
action. 240 By its very nature, such a provision is useful only for a
corporation with a manageable number of shareholders. The pun
is intentional. Besides small enterprises, it will be available to cor-
porations where a large block of stock is owned or controlled, direct-
ly or indirectly, by a few inside, management personnel who can
act informally as they wish.
The New York provision seemingly leaves unsolved certain mat-
ters as to disclosure and notice. After all, statutory notice to share-
287 IOWA CODE § 496A.138 (1962).
238 IOWA CODE § 496A.32 (1962) (second paragraph).
21' Iowa CODE § 496A.32 (1962) (last paragraph).
240 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 615 (a).
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holders is given only for a "meeting," 241 but these procedures are
alternatives to "meetings." Unanimous action implies that each
shareholder in some sense knows of the action since by hypothesis
he has signed the consent. Less-than-unanimous action without a
meeting lacks this intrinsic safeguard. Non-unanimous action,
though impeccably conforming to the authorized charter clause, may
invite courts to take an exceptionally close look, particularly if some
shareholders are ignorant of the action taken. To avoid such risks,
insiders would do well to notify all shareholders in advance of the
action proposed to be taken in this fashion. Better still, any statute
authorizing such action should specifically require that notice, either
before or after the action is taken, be given to all shareholders who
would be entitled to vote on the matter if a meeting had been called
and the matter submitted to them.242 In either case, shareholders
could still act informally by less than a unanimous vote, but it
would be fairer and more prudent to give notice and thereby reduce
the risk of judicial hostility, particularly if the transaction involves
"interested" persons.
Besides New York, Nevada permits less-than-unanimous share-
holder action without a meeting.243 California, however, limits such
action to approving a merger by "written consent of the holders of
not less than two-thirds" of the shares entitled to vote on the merg-
er.
244
4. Persons Entitled to Vote: Like the Model Act,245 recent re-
visions go into considerable detail as to voting by fiduciaries of
various types.2 46 Several jurisdictions, unlike the Model Act, have
special rules for shares with multiple owners, for example, joint
and common tenants, whether or not they are fiduciaries. 247 As
earlier noted,248 Iowa contributes a provision by which the articles
of A Corporation may permit stock owned by B Corporation in A
Corporation to be voted at A's meeting even though A owns a
241 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 605 (a).
2 2It is perhaps possible to deduce such a requirement from the complex interplay
of N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAiv §§ 602 (a), 605 (a).2 43NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.320 (1) (1963).
2"4 CAL. CORP. CODE § 4107.215 ABA-ALl MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 831 (1953).
240 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 609 (d)-(f) (pledgors and pledgees), 625 (infants).
"t7E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 311a(f) (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 612(h); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.46 (E) (Page 1964).
24 See notes 238-39 supra and accompanying text.
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majority of the shares in B.249 Thus, A could turn over a block of
A stock to B, a subsidiary (or otherwise controlled corporation),
and B would be able to vote these shares at A's annual meeting-
presumably on instructions from A. Of course, such shares may be
so voted "if, but only if, the articles so provide .... ,,2"0 Arguably,
this safeguard may not be wholly adequate to prevent abuse.
While Iowa thus swallows a camel, several jurisdictions strain
at the gnat of a corporation voting its own shares which it holds in
a fiduciary capacity. Although such concern is not misplaced, it is
questionable whether the probable danger justifies the burdensome
restrictions placed by some states on such fiduciaries. While Wis-
consin and Oklahoma broadly permit voting of fiduciary-owned
shares, 251 and Kentucky has reached the same result by judicial
reading of its statutes, 252 Virginia requires a second, independent
fiduciary,25 3 and North Carolina requires a court to appoint an
"independent and disinterested trustee" on a showing of a "neces-
sity" for his voting the shares.25 4 Usually, the number of corpora-
tions holding their own stock as trustees is small, and frequently
the number of shares so owned is a small proportion, although
occasional situations have arisen where a corporation's fiduciary-
owned shares might be decisive in voting.2 55 However, it seems fair
to assume that the corporate fiduciary acting through its trust offi-
cers will hesitate to vote the shares so as to favor the corporation
at the expense of the beneficiary's interests; for if this happened,
there would be a breach of duty both to beneficiary and to share-
holders. It seems questionable to single out for special restriction
the voting of fiduciary-owned shares. Rather, the cause for concern,
2' The exact wording of IowA CODE § 496A.32 (1962) is that "neither treasury
shares nor, unless the articles of incorporation otherwise provide, shares held by
another corporation if a majority of the shares entitled to vote for the election of
directors of such other corporation is held by the corporation, shall be voted at
any meeting or counted in determining the total number of outstanding shares at
any given time."
-90 Comment, IowA CoDE ANN. § 496A.32, at 306 (1962).
251 See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.25 (2) (1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.65 (b) (1953).
212 Graves v. Security Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1963).
222 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-82 (1964).
25 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-67 (b) (1965).
29; In Graves v. Security Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1963), the twenty-four per
cent block of bank stock held in a fiduciary capacity by the bank was decisive in
approving a merger. It is reported that Cleveland Trust Co. holds thirty-three per
cent of its own shares in fiduciary accounts. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 21, 1965, p. 2,
col. 3.
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if any, should be not the rare opportunity to misuse voting power,
but the chance that the corporate fiduciary will hold its own shares
in trust at a time when an independent trustee would sell the
shares.2 6 If, however, a restriction is in order, it would seem best
simply to create an independent co-trustee, or perhaps two co-trus-
tees who would then have a majority vote.
5. Cumulative Voting: Corporation laws continue the old split
on permissive versus mandatory cumulative voting, despite some
tendency of the recent revisions to make it permissive unless blocked
by constitutional provisions. Technical developments include pro-
visions requiring advance notice from a shareholder intending to
cumulate his votes so as not to catch off-guard other shareholders
who have perhaps fallen into the habit of voting straight during an
era of good feeling, and provisions affording a brief recess of the
meeting to allow the parties to calculate the most effective cumula-
tion of their votes.257 Whether cumulative voting is mandatory or
permissive, an occasional statute protects it by forbidding a director's
removal if the votes against such action would be sufficient to elect
him258 or by prohibiting a reduction in the number of directors
under substantially the same test.259
6. Protecting High Quorum and Vote Requirements: Several
jurisdictions recognize that high-vote requirements embodied in the
charter or shareholder-adopted by-laws may possibly be amended out
by the normal statutory majority or two-thirds vote. Even if the
charter forbade amendment except by the high vote, it might be
possible to amend out that provision and then remove the high-vote
clause. Hopefully, courts would see realities and protect the high-
vote requirement in both instances rather than allow a carefully
wrought bargain to be subverted. However, no one can confidently
predict such a result, especially if the high-vote requirement had
produced a deadlock which threatened corporate profits or exis-
tence. Several recent statutes deal with the issue. South Carolina
specifically protects high votes on amendment, merger, and sale of
assets. 2°0 Connecticut does better with a single clause applicable
211 See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 170.15, at 1233 (2d ed. 1956).
2r.7 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.20 (b) (Supp. 1965).
M08 N.Y. Bus. Coin,. LAw § 706 (c) (1).
251 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.090 (1) (3) (a) (Supp. 1965).
200 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-19.4 (c) (4) (charter amendments), -20.3 (d) (4) (mergers
and consolidations), -21.3 (b) (3) (sale of assets) (Supp. 1965).
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to every high vote specified in the articles of incorporation.201 New
York allows a high vote to be added or removed by a two-thirds
vote of all shares or by a greater than two-thirds vote if the certifi-
cate requires such a greater vote for this specific purpose.2 2 Thus,
in New York, complete protection for a unanimous voting require-
ment ultimately comes from a charter provision that only a unani-
mous vote may remove or modify this provision, thereby putting the
burden on the certificate draftsmen to think out the degree of pro-
tection desired. Moreover, the high-vote requirement *must be con-
spicuously noted on the stock certificate. 263
7. Proxy Voting: As in the past, state statutes authorize proxy
voting but provide only tangential, if any, regulation or control.
Probably, all statutes recognize proxy voting in the Model Act sense
that "a shareholder may vote . . . by proxy . .. ,,,264 without de-
claring that a shareholder is entitled to vote by proxy. Perhaps
statutes should confer on shareholders a right to a proxy vote in
case articles of incorporation or by-laws might purport to deprive
them of this only feasible means, in many corporations, of partici-
pating in its affairs,265 however little the opportunity may be valued
by shareholders. While proxies have usually been solicited with
minimal mandatory disclosure of the proposed action or relevant
201 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-329 (c) (1960). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.37 (3) (6)
(Supp. 1965) achieves the same result somewhat obliquely.
202 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 616 (b).
282 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 616(c). New York, incidentally, is the only state which
gives such protection to a superstatutory quorum requirement; other jurisdictions do
so only for a high vote provision. It is questionable whether a high quorum, with
its possibilities of forcing deadlock merely by absence from meetings, merits the
same protection as a high-vote requirement, which at least compels the dissenter to
appear, talk, listen, and fight for his interests if only as a Neinsager.2 11 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORPv. Acr § 31 (1953).
26" Two older American statutes appear to guarantee a right to vote by proxy.
See IDAmo CODE ANN. § 30-134 (3) (1948); LA. RIv. STAT. § 12:32 (c) (1951). Both the
English and the Northern Ireland Companies Act specifically provide that "any
member of a company entitled to attend and vote at a meeting of the company
shall be entitled to appoint another person [whether a member or not) as his proxy
to attend and vote instead of himself .... ." Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo.
6, c. 38, § 136 (1); Companies Act, 1960, 9 Eliz. 2, c. 22, § 130 (1) (No. Ireland).
Both statutes require the notice of meeting to declare this statutory right of proxy
voting. Since a close corporation may want its shareholders to vote in person, a
close corporation statute could appropriately permit such a charter clause even
though a statute grants a right of proxy voting. The English and Northern Ireland
statutes have no such exception, but Northern Ireland does provide that only a
shareholder of a private company may act as proxy for another shareholder of the
same company. Companies Act, 1960, 9 Eliz. 2, c. 22, § 130 (2) (b) (ii) (No. Ireland).
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facts266 the Iowa statute leaves room for management effectively to
deprive the shareholders of their votes by demanding that votes be
cast, if at all, in person, perhaps at a "meeting" at the president's
hunting lodge in upper Canada.26 7 It would require a dedicated,
if not courageous, "corporate democrat" to appear in person in such
circumstances, particularly if, as is likely, he would encounter a per-
mitted charter clause barring a shareholder resolution not previous-
ly noticed by the directors for action at the meeting.26 8 It does not,
however, require a convinced exponent of the theory of shareholder
democracy to discern the unfairness of such statutory and charter
provisions, either singly or in combination.
Not unlike the earlier proxy statutes, the recent enactments allow
varying periods of duration for a proxy, with Massachusetts pre-
scribing possibly the shortest life by invalidating a proxy dated six
months before the meeting for which it is given and terminating
its effectiveness after the meeting's final adjournment. 269 Various
states go beyond the Model Act provision 7 and enumerate kinds
of writings which constitute valid proxies.2 71 The newer revisions
often protect the corporation from automatic revocation by death,
supervening incapacity, or a shareholder's unheralded appearance
in person at the meeting, by requiring written notice directed to
an appropriate officer before the power given by the proxy is exer-
2 The potential evils of non-disclosure have been allayed for many large unlisted
corporations by Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(c), added by 78 Stat. 570 (1964),
15 U.S.C. § 78n (c) (1964). See Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Act
Amendments of 1964, 1964 DuKE. L.J. 706.
.-o Like ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 26 (1953), IOWA CODE § 496A.27 (1962)
authorizes shareholder meetings "at such place, either within or without this state,"
as provided by the articles or by-laws or fixed in accordance with their provisions.
As earlier noted, Iowa impliedly permits a corporation to insert a clause in
the articles "limiting or denying the right to vote by proxy." IowA CODE § 496A.32
(1962) (last paragraph). Such a de facto disfranchisement of shareholders fits neatly
with other provisions authorizing decreased quorum and vote requirements for share-
holder action. Thus, a few selected shareholder guests at the hunting lodge or
on the yacht could readily take all necessary action.
208 IowA CODE § 496A.56 (1) (1962) (five per cent of voting shares may compel notic-
ing a proposed amendment to the articles "unless otherwise provided in the articles
of incorporation . . . .
200 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 41 (Supp. 1965).
27 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Act § 31 (1953). "A shareholder may vote either
in person or by proxy executed in writing by the shareholder or by his duly
authorized attorney in fact. No proxy shall be valid after eleven months from the
date of its execution, unless otherwise provided in the proxy."
E71 .g, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-336 (a) (Supp. 1965); Omo Rxv. CODE ANN. §
1701.48 (B) (Page Supp. 1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.14(b) (Supp. 1965).
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cised.27 2 South Carolina, in addition, requires proxies to be dated
as of their execution, barring undated or postdated instruments.2 7 8
On the state level, useful results hopefully will follow from the
South Carolina provision,2 7 4 inspired by SEC Proxy Rule 14a-9, 275
forbidding solicitation of any proxy "on the basis of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting, or other communica-
tion, written or oral" employing a misleading statement or omis-
sion. Although this provision is not supported by the prophylaxis
of administrative supervision, court enforcement at the instance of
an aggrieved shareholder should deter at least some grosser forms
of misconduct.276
Several state statutes contain provisions relevant to the "proper
subject" concept of SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8.277 Almost unknown is
North Carolina's declaration that "any matter relating to the affairs
of a corporation is a proper subject for action at an annual meeting
of shareholders .... 278 The SEC proxy rules clearly do not view
every shareholder proposal as a "proper subject" and bar a proposal
which "is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper sub-
ject for action by security holders. ' 279 Since state statutes seldom
address themselves to the allocation of powers between shareholders
and management (beyond specifying acts which require shareholder
approval), the SEC's task of applying this standard has not been an
easy one. Perhaps the resort to "advisory" proposals has been a
convenient (and, all things considered, desirable) way out.280 The
North Carolina provision surely must go beyond even the fondest
dreams of the SEC staff. Literally, it obliterates the distinctions
usually observed by the SEC and would allow shareholders to pre-
sent resolutions on matters such as financial policy, labor relations,
dividends, sales policy, racial questions, advertising, and other "af-
fairs" normally deemed exclusive management prerogatives not to
272 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-336(d) (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.48
(E) (Page Supp. 1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.14 (c) (Supp. 1965).
273 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.14 (c) (Supp. 1965).
274 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.14 (e) (Supp. 1965).
.7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1964). The statutory provision closely tracks the typical
SEC "and-fraud" language.
276 Although it would have been well for the statute specifically to grant courts
jurisdiction to grant all needed relief, it is assumed that enforcement will be
available since, otherwise, the statute is merely hortatory and a counsel of ethics.
277 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1964).
278 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-61 (d) (1965); see also N.C. GEN.'STAT. § 55-62 (b) (1965).
279 SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8 (c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (c) (1) (1964).
280 On advisory proposals, see 2 Loss, SEcuxrrms REGULATrON 908-11 (1961).
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be invaded even by "advisory" proposals. How far the SEC will
go in relation to North Carolina shareholder proposals is uncertain,
although it may choose to continue its own rules of self-restraint
even when state law makes almost anything a "proper subject."'281
A different problem is presented by statutes which arguably con-
fine shareholder interests, as a matter of state law, exclusively to
those matters on which they have specific authority to vote. The
Model Act formulation 28 2 is too vague to mean much in terms of
intracorporate allocation of powers and thus probably offers little
help in culling proper from improper subjects. The Massachusetts
statute, presumably not specifically intended to meet this problem,
takes a stronger tack by stating that "the directors may exercise all
the powers of the corporation" (rather than merely manage its
"business and affairs") "except such as by law, by the articles of
organization or by the by-laws of the corporation are conferred
upon or reserved to the stockholders." 28 3 This language can be read
as a distribution, granted or permitted by state law, of specified
powers to the shareholders with the directors having all residual
power and authority. If so, the SEC could be forced into polarized
positions on the scope of "proper subject" depending upon whether
a shareholder proposes a resolution to a North Carolina or a Massa-
chusetts corporation. Indeed, the focus of the problem will likely
shift in the future. It is probable that eventually the Model Act
and various states will draft language, probably stronger than Massa-
chusetts', to negate, so far as state law can, the "propriety" of sub-
jects for shareholder action.2 4 If state law does attempt in the
281 Compare SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8 (c) (5), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 (c) (5) (1964), pro-
viding that management need not include a shareholder proposal if it "consists of
a recommendation or request that the management take action with respect to a
matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer."
2-2 "The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of
directors." ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 33 (1953).
283 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 54 (Supp. 1965); see also MAss. EN. LAws
ANN. ch. 156B, § 47 (Supp. 1965).
-84An analogy is the Model Act's provision, widely adopted, that "nothing in
this Act contained shall be construed to authorize [the adopting] . . . State to
regulate the organization or the internal affairs . . ." of a foreign corporation seeking
to do business locally. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 99 (1953). Most new
revisions include this language, although Texas abjured regulation of a foreign
corporation's "internal affairs not intrastate in Texas." TEx. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN.
art. 8.01 (A) (1956). South Carolina altogether deleted this clause. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-23.1 (a) (Supp. 1965). New York adopts certain types of internal regulation for
foreign corporations doing business in New York. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. ACT §§ 1315-20.
The Model Act provision was designed to dissuade any jurisdiction from seeking
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future to limit shareholder interests at meetings, the SEC may well
be forced to reconsider whether it should formulate this question of
federal law in state law terms or whether it should treat the con-
tent of shareholder proposals by a uniform national standard in
the interests of effective shareholder participation through the proxy
process.
IV. SHAREHOLDER CONTROL DEVICES
1. Voting Trusts: The old view that voting trusts improperly
segregate the vote from beneficial ownership has been abandoned
by validating provisions in all of the recent revisions and amend-
ments. Statutes usually limit the trust life to ten years, but several
recent enactments authorize extensions of the trust for an additional
ten-year period.2 5 New York has permitted the trust to be extended
for more than one additional ten-year period,20 but of course, only
shareholders who are parties to the extended trust are affected there-
by.287 These statutes contain a minor ambiguity as to whether the
new trust runs from the expiration date of the old trust or from
the date when the extension is made, although presumably good
draftsmanship would stipulate the former.288 South Carolina pre-
vents invalidation of an entire trust merely because its duration
might exceed the statutory ten-year period,2 9 but also provides that
to exert local control over internal affairs of a pseudo-foreign corporation, as was done
in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1961). For a full discussion, see Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65
YALE Lj. 137 (1955). See also Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate
Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REv.
1118 (1958).
28 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-338(d) (1960); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 621 (d);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-72(d) (1965); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.325 (Supp. 1965)
(effective July 1, 1967).
288 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 621 (d).
287The other statutes can be read as suggesting that only one extension is per-
missible.
288 Thus, under the North Carolina provision, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-72 (d) (1965),
the ten-year period of the extended trust runs from the "effective date of the amend-
ment" which extends or otherwise amends the original voting trust. Since the
amendment must be "signed by the Trustee and by all the Trust Certificate Hold-
ers," it follows that if there is any dissent to an extension, an entirely new voting
trust must be created, rather than the old one extended, though with binding
effect only upon those who assent. On this point, the New York statute, which
permits the latter result, is preferable. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 621 (d).
288 The South Carolina provision responds to Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line
Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 37-42, 191 Ad. 828, 825-27 (Ch. 1937), which invalidated a
trust which might extend beyond ten years. But cf. Holmes v. Sharretts, 228 Md.
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the trust becomes "inoperative" thereafter.2 0 Ohio interestingly
preserves common law voting trusts from pre-emption by the statu-
tory voting trust which is limited to ten years.291
Occasional statutes spell out a few rights of certificate holders.
Thus, North and South Carolina reserve the right of beneficiaries
under the voting trust to vote on fundamental corporate changes.292
A few statutes give certificate holders rights to inspect corporate
books 3 or to institute derivative actions.294 Other states have one
or more unique provisions. 295
2. Irrevocable Proxies: The statutes of New York,29 6 Connecti-
cut,297 and South Carolina2 98 contain provisions specifically author-
izing various types of irrevocable proxies, the most important of
which is the irrevocable proxy annexed to a shareholders' voting
agreement. Each statute spells out slightly different provisions for
duration of the proxy, and all three protect the innocent purchaser
of shares subject to an irrevocable proxy unless the existence of the
proxy is conspicuously noted on the stock certificate.
3. Voting Agreements: Several recent revisions and amendments
have specifically authorized shareholder voting agreements. This is
desirable, not so much because of old fears of invalidity, but be-
cause voting trust statutes might be read, as they were in Delaware,
to pre-empt the field and bar voting agreements (especially those
with enforcement provisions) among shareholders2 99 This result
should be avoided since no sound policy reason requires forcing all
358, 180 A.2d 302 (1962) (voting trust limited to statutory ten-year period despite
trust language indicating a possibly longer duration).
200 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.16 (f) (Supp. 1965).
292 OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 1701.49 (I) (Page 1964).
202 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-72 (c) (1965) (mandatory); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.16(g)
(Supp. 1965) (may be varied by voting trust agreement).
203E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 621 (c), 624(b).
214 E.g., NED. REv. STAT. § 21-2047 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626 (a);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-516 (A) (Supp. 1966).
295For example, under the Kentucky statute, the agreement may excuse the
trustee from executing and delivering voting trust certificates, but certificates, if
issued, may be transferred "in the same manner and with the same effect as certifi-
cates of stock" under Kentucky's version of the Uniform Commercial Code. Ky. REv.
STAT. § 271.325 (5) (1962). The statutory standard of trustee responsibility only for
"his own individual neglect or malfeasance" may be varied by the trust agreement.
Ky. REv STAT. § 271.325 (7) (d) (1962). Like provisions appear in OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1.66 (f) (1953).
200 N.Y. Bus. CoR,. LAw §§ 609()" (g).
D7 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-337 (b) (Supp. 1965).
208 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-16.14()-(g) (Supp. 1965).
29D See Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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shareholder control devices into the somewhat formalistic mold of
a voting trust. Accordingly, voting agreements are specifically au-
thorized in New York,300 Connecticut, 301 South Carolina,0 2 Tex-
as,303 and Wyoming.304  Connecticut, South Carolina, and Texas
limit the agreement to ten years,30 5 thereby securing parity with
voting trusts, and all three provide for extensions. Connecticut and
Texas require filing with the corporation subject to shareholder
inspection rights and also protect subsequent purchasers of shares
subject to the agreement by requiring a conspicuous notation on
the stock certificates. Thus, in Connecticut and Texas, the agree-
ment looks more like a formal voting trust, while in New York,
South Carolina, and Wyoming it is closer to the common law voting
pool. Wyoming has made a particularly valuable addition in this
area by providing:
In an action by a shareholder who is a party to such an agreement
a court of competent jurisdiction may enjoin another party or
parties to such agreement from voting his or their shares in viola-
don thereof, and the court may, in an action to which the cor-
poration is a party, by appropriate decree set aside an election
of directors or other action resulting from the voting of shares
in violation of such agreement, and in addition the court may
grant such other or further relief as is appropriate under the
circumstances for the enforcement of such agreement. 06
Texas and South Carolina also authorize enforcement of the agree-
ment,30 7 but without the comprehensive grant of jurisdiction found
in Wyoming. In all three states, at the very least, such statutes are
declaratory of a favorable legislative attitude which should discour-
800 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620 (a).
3" CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-339 (Supp. 1965).
802 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.15 (Supp. 1965).
303Tax. Bus. CoP. Aar ANN. art. 2.30 (1956).
80, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.31 (1965).
3
°5Professor Bradley suggests that the ten-year limitation on the life of voting
agreements under the South Carolina statute is "a reactionary requirement" incon-
sistent with the "dose corporation concept of freedom and flexibility" which he
generously says that statute embraced. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close
Corporation-The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145, 1173
(1966). However, the ease with which such agreements (and voting trusts) may be
extended, in South Carolina and in the other states, answers that contention. Policy
considerations also call for parity as to duration of the several kinds of permissible
control devices, and for reopening the control arrangements after a reasonable time
for changes, adjustments, or admission or resignation of parties to the particular ar-
rangement.
300 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.31 (1965).
307 Statutes cited notes 302-03 supra.
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age courts from narrow construction and niggardly enforcement of
shareholder agreements.
V. OTHER SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
1. Minutes and Records of Corporations: Apart from the gen-
erally adopted Model Act provisions requiring keeping corporate
records and authorizing inspection by qualified shareholders, 3° the
variations among the states are not surprising. Thus, among the
new revisions, a statute may delete the statutory requirement of
keeping books and records,309 reduce or eliminate the Model Act's
qualifications for shareholder inspection, 310 or eliminate or change
the procedures and penalties when a corporation refuses to permit
inspection.311 An occasional statute gives shareholders additional
rights to compel certain information.31 2
208 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 46 (1953). This statute authorizes inspec-
tion only by one who has been a shareholder of record for at least six months
before his demand or who holds of record at least five per cent of "all outstanding
shares of a corporation."309WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.44 (1965).
310 There are numerous variations here. Some states have no holding or per-
centage qualifications. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-334(b) (1960); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 16-10-47 (1962). Mississippi requires only a one per cent stockholding, MIss. CODE
ANN. § 5309-111 (Supp. 1964), and New York and South Carolina measure the five
per cent holding, not against "all the outstanding shares" as in the Model Act, but
against "the outstanding shares of any class" and also permit aggregations of holdings
to make up the statutorily required percentage, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(b); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-16.26 (a) (2) (Supp. 1965).
""
1 The Model Act has an awkward procedure by which if a corporation refuses
inspection, the complaining shareholder may sue for a small statutory penalty, and
the corporation may then defend on various grounds. Sometimes, this is deleted.
E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2050 (Supp. 1963). New York has a much better pro-
cedure by which the corporation has limited discretion to deny access to a share-
holder who refuses to furnish an affidavit as to proper purpose and no past sales
of shareholder lists. On denial, the shareholder must initiate a court suit to procure
the desired records. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 624 (c)-(d).
312 Under ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 46 (1953), the corporation must
honor a shareholder's written request for a copy of its most recent balance sheet
and profit-and-loss statement. Under D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-920(d) (1961), a five per
cent shareholder may demand that the corporation prepare and file within thirty days
a "particular account of its assets and liabilities in detail," which any shareholder
may thereafter inspect and copy.
On the other hand, an occasional statute will sharply curtail, at least for certain
corporations, a pre-existing broad statutory right of inspection. Thus, the North
Carolina statute which entitles qualified shareholders to inspect as of right the
"books and records of account," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38 (b) (1965), was amended in
1965 to exclude, in the case of banks, any of "the deposit records or loan records
of a bank customer"; these are available only on court order granted "for good
cause shown." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38 (i) (Supp. 1965). This small indicator that
banking "regulation" favors bank management and depositors over bank shareholders
was a swift legislative reaction to a decision construing "books and records," subject
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Perhaps the most interesting innovations are the statutes specifi-
cally declaring, in New York's language, that various books and
records are "prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein in favor
of the plaintiff" in suits against the corporation or its directors,
officers or shareholders. 313 Connecticut more generally makes such
documents "prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein" only
if "certified to be true" by the corporation's secretary. It also de-
clares that when referred to in such documents, meetings are deemed
duly held and called, motions and resolutions duly adopted, and
director elections and officer appointments deemed valid, until in-
validity is proved, presumably by the person challenging the state-
ments. Finally, "whenever a person has acted in good faith in
reliance upon any such certified original or copy, it is conclusive in
his favor." While much the same result would presumably be
reached without statute, it is good to see such provisions codified.814
California and New York also explicitly recognize the use of
data retrieval systems. New York authorizes all books and records
of account, minutes, and shareholder records to be kept in any
non-written form, if "capable of being converted into written form
within a reasonable time."31 5 California, while specifying various
permissible methods of storing information, only extends the statu-
tory permission to the stockholder records. 16
Voting lists for shareholder meetings are becoming harder to
obtain. In 1964, the Model Act deleted its earlier provisions re-
quiring the corporation to prepare and keep on file for ten days
before the meeting a shareholder list for any shareholder to inspect.
Now the list is available only at the meeting. 17 The effect of the
to inspection of right, to include the now barred loan and deposit records. Cooke
v. Outland, 265 N.C. 601, 144 S.E.2d 835 (1965).
313 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 624(g); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-416 (1960); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-24.9 (Supp. 1965).
'"' There are potentially significant differences in the books and records subject
to inspection under the New York, Connecticut, and South Carolina statutes. New
York includes books and records of account, minutes of shareholder proceedings,
director and committee meetings, and shareholder lists. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§
624 (a), (g). The other two states refer to minutes of the proceedings of incorporators,
shareholders, directors, and committees; and also add written consents, waivers, etc.,
and any statements "that no specified proceeding was had or that no specified con-
sent, waiver, release or agreement exists .... ." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-416
(1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-24.9 (Supp. 1965). Connecticut and South Carolina,
therefore, do not include shareholder records or financial records and books.
' 1 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 624 (a).
31" CAL. CoR. CODE § 3002.
317 See 3 MODEL Bus. CoR. ACr ANN. § 29 (Supp. 1966).
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change is that information formerly available through a voting list
must be obtained under the shareholder-inspection provisions, sub-
ject to the percentage or time-of-holding restrictions. South Da-
kota318 and Wisconsin' 19 have followed the change, while Virginia
retains the old provision but in the case of a listed corporation
requires shareholders to establish percentage or time-of-holding
qualifications.3 20
2. Shareholder Derivative Actions: Since the most significant
developments continue to occur in judicial decisions, only a few
statutory provisions seem significant.321 To the extent that the new
revisions follow the Model Act, they normally make important
changes, often by deleting the Model Act's security-for-expenses pro-
visions or by allowing the court to unload on plaintiff all reasonable
expenses of all defendants on a finding that the suit lacked "reason-
able cause." Often retained is a statutory rule of contemporaneous
ownership of shares (or, in a few instances, voting trust certificates)
necessary to qualify a shareholder as plaintiff.3 2 2 Somewhat unusual
is the Pennsylvania provision giving the court discretion to waive
the contemporaneous ownership requirement on showing "a strong
prima facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the
corporation and that without such suit serious injustice will re-
sult."83
In line with cases relaxing old and highly ambiguous case law
requirements of a "demand on shareholders"3 24 are statutes in sev-
eral states specifically requiring a demand on directors (or explana-
tion of a failure to do so) but not mentioning recourse to the share-
holders.325 A Delaware Chancery Court rule is more explicit and
abolishes the requirement.3 26 In at least three states, an instituted
1 8 S.D. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 22, § 29.
313 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.29 (1) (Supp. 1966).
"
20 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-30 (1964).
13 MODEL Bus. CoP. Acr ANN. § 43A (1960, Supp. 1966).
22 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 626 (a), (b); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405 (1) (a) (1957).
823 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-516 (A) (Supp. 1966).
124 See, e.g., Levitt v. Johnson, 34 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964) (registered investment
company); Mayer v. Adams, 57 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
323 CAL. CoP. CODE § 834 (a) (2); N.Y. Bus. CoP. LAw § 626 (c); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.811 (Page Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180A05 (1) (b) (1957).
328 The requirement of a demand on directors was deleted in DEL. CH. Or. R.
28(b), as amended April 27, 1961. This amendment does not appear in the 1964
supplement to DEL. CODE ANN. See letter from the Hon. Collins J. Seitz, former
Chancellor of the State of Delaware, to John Gallagher, member, Delaware Code
Revision Commission, June 24, 1965.
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action may be discontinued, compromised, or settled only with the
consent of the court.3 2 7 The deficiency is that the buy-off of a threat-
ened action seems to be outside the statutory scheme. The need is,
of course, for judicial recognition of a broad principle that any
funds received by a shareholder, whether in compromise of an insti-
tuted or a threatened suit, are held by the shareholder as a construc-
tive trustee for the corporation,328 or better still, for statutory
language so providing. Unfortunately, where several statutes quite
properly declare that amounts received in a judgment, compromise,
or settlement of a derivative action inure to the corporation, the
legislation seems limited only to the suit which has been insti-
tuted.329
VI. FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE CHANGES
Recent statutory enactments have consistently dealt separately
with certain procedural prerequisites for corporate action amount-
ing to a fundamental change in the structure or identity of the
corporation. Under the familiar title of "fundamental corporate
changes," this discussion briefly reviews provisions in the recent
statutes concerning amendments to the articles of incorporation,
mergers, sales and other dispositions of assets, dissolution, statutory
efforts to meet the de facto merger problem, and shareholder ap-
praisal rights.
1. Amending Articles of Incorporation: The law in this area
has remained relatively static, and, so far as the new and amended
statutes have touched it, the changes are chiefly technical. All revi-
sions grant sweeping power to amend.330 The vote required for amend-
ment varies from a majority to two-thirds of the shares entitled to
vote on the amendment.33' Class voting is ordinarily preserved with
a few states expressly authorizing voting by series if one or more
but less than all series within a class are affected.33 2 Occasionally a
recent statute excuses from any shareholder vote certain minor mat-
ters which per accidens take the form of an amendment of the
37 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-223 (F) (1966); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626(d); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.405 (2) (1957).
32 See Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
8" N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626 (e); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180A05 (8) (1957).
330 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 53 (1953).
281 Compare ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 54 (1953) with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 803 (a).
332 ILL REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.54 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 804 (b).
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articles, for example, the location of the corporation's registered
office or the identity or address of its registered agent.333 Similarly,
exceptions to required shareholder approval will be made for amend-
ments prior to the organizational meeting 34 or before shares are
issued.3 5 State variation on the procedure for restating the articles
of incorporation may range from the Model Act's pre-1962 needless
requirement of a two-thirds shareholder vote for every restate-
ment330 to the more reasonable provision permitting directors to
restate absent further amendments or changes, in which event share-
holder approval is necessary and proper.33 7
Apart from class voting, little statutory protection is available
for minority voting or for non-voting shares. States which did not
previously authorize dissenters' rights on amendment have not em-
braced that remedy despite the enlarged amendment powers vested
in the shareholders. 338 Nebraska's 1963 revision retained its judicial
procedure enabling any shareholder "adversely affected" by a pro-
posed amendment "changing the existing priority rights or provi-
sions of any class of shares outstanding" to secure court relief against
such an amendment for "fraud or unfairness." 339 The court must
enjoin the amendment unless management or other proponents
prove it to be "fair, just and equitable to all shareholders affected
thereby."3 40 A better wrought procedure is provided by the English
Companies Act and duplicated in other jurisdictions influenced by
that statute.341 The salient provisions of the English law, along with
the Jenkins Committee recommendations, are that fifteen per cent
333 N.Y. Bus. COP. LAw § 803 (b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-19.3 (Supp. 1965).
34 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-19.2 (Supp. 1965) (amendment by incorporators; dissent-
ing subscribers may rescind without liability).
815 ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.360(2) (1963) (amendment by directors; subscriber may
rescind within thirty days, after which subscriber is bound).
'3 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 59 (1953).
337 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-362 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Bus. COP. LAW § 807 (a).
Several states have specifically recognized postponed effectiveness of an amendment.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANm. ch. 156B, § 72 (Supp. 1965). In 1963, Florida added a pro-
vision generally permitting a maximum ninety day postponement of effective dates
for filed articles of incorporation, charter amendments, and documents relating to
mergers, consolidations, and voluntary dissolution. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.041 (Supp.
1965).
338An example is N.Y. Bus. COP. LAw § 806(b)(6) continuing rights provided
in N.Y. STE. COm. LAiw §§ 37, 38. Compare Pennsylvania's efforts in 1963 and 1965
to extricate itself from a like procedure. Compare Pa. Laws 1963, No. 1381, § 10
with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-810 (B) (Supp. 1966).
'30 NEm. R Ev. STAT. § 21-2059 (Supp. 1963).
'o Ibid.
3" Companies Act, 1948, c. 38, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, § 72.
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of the shareholders of the affected class may petition the court to
vacate a "variation of the rights" voted by the majority. The court
has discretion to so vacate on a finding that the change would "un-
fairly prejudice the shareholders of the class" affected, but otherwise
it "shall ...confirm the variation." Speedy action is guaranteed
by a requirement that the petition must be filed within twenty-one
days of the resolution. The Jenkins Committee found widespread
support for this procedure and recommended reducing the statutory
percentage from fifteen to ten per cent; extending the time for filing
the petition; and removing the requirement in the present statute
that all shares comprising the fifteen per cent block petitioning for
relief must have voted against the "variation." Apart from the
potential difficulty of putting together such a block in so little time,
the Jenkins Committee found that the existing requirement barred
a nominee holding shares of record for beneficial owners who were
split on the question of approval from petitioning for relief on
behalf of the dissenting beneficial owners. 42 This is the same prob-
lem which induced several American statutes to authorize a record
owner of shares, such as a broker, to dissent and seek appraisal rights
for beneficial owners opposed to some corporate action, while voting
for the action on behalf of other owners. 43 Even the existing En-
glish statute, which would certainly be improved if all Jenkins Com-
mittee recommendations were enacted, is an improvement over the
Nebraska statute both in requiring some substantial number of
shareholders to set aside the amendment and in articulating the
appropriate procedure to do so.
Initiating the amendment process normally remains exclusively
with the directors, who need not notice a shareholder's proposed
amendment. Apparently, only a few new revisions authorize a stated
percentage of shareholders to compel voting on an amendment, and
these revisions echo earlier procedures. 344
8,2 Company Law Committee, Report, CAi. No. 1749, at 71-73 (1962).
8'3 See notes 377, 382, 391, 398-400 infra and accompanying text.
3,, IowA CoDE § 496A.56 (1) (1962) (five per cent or more of shares entitled to vote;
may be abolished by charter); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 12-19A (d) (Supp. 1965) (ten per cent
of any class of shares); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 16-10-55 (b) (1962) (notice must state that
amendment is proposed by shareholders; management may recommend acceptance or
rejection); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.52 (a) (1965) (ten per cent of any class of shares).
England and Northern Ireland provide that if five per cent of the shareholders pro-
pose a resolution of a kind which "may properly be moved and is intended to be
moved" at the meeting, management must circulate both the resolution and a state-
ment of more than 1000 words, if the documents are received in due time together
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2. Corporate Fusions: All of the new and amended statutes, with
the important exception of Ohio, adhere to the traditional and
formalistic distinction between merger and consolidation, sale of
assets, and (to the limited extent statutes deal with it) purchase and
sale of controlling shares.345 Although business and finance choose
one or the other of these fusion methods for good economic and tax
reasons, the choice is, unfortunately, needlessly shaped by different
substantive consequences of the procedure chosen, including differ-
ent voting requirements and shareholder appraisal rights. Besides
the irrational statutory differences, several courts further confuse
the matter by hanging a sword of Damocles in the form of an
asset sale or share acquisition upon transactions constituting a
merger "in reality." Critically needed is a complete rethinking of
this entire area in favor of a single flexible procedure or, better
still, the shearing of the differential consequences of traditional
methods.
(a) Merger and Consolidation: Here, two moderately significant
changes have emerged in the new statutes. First, the required share-
holder vote for a merger or consolidation has typically been reduced.
Prior to 1962, the Model Act and many states required a two-thirds
vote of all outstanding shares whether or not entitled to vote,
3 46
although there was great variation among the states on what shares
and how many could vote. In 1962, the Model Act was amended
to require only a two-thirds vote of shares entitled to vote on the
matter,347 which means, of course, that usually only common will
vote. Thus, preferred stock continues to lose protective rights or
journeys more and more to the bondholder end of the spectrum,
depending upon one's view of such developments. A few states
permit the statutory two-thirds to drop to a majority348 or, under
the Iowa dispensation, even below a majority.349 Class voting con-
with tender of the expenses. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 140;
Companies Act (No. Ireland), 1960, 9 Eliz. 2, c. 22, § 184.
31rA curiosity in this area is Oklahoma's enactment of a statute, supplementing
its merger and asset sale provisions, authorizing "reorganizations" in language very
similar to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (a)(1). OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 18, § 1.170a
(Supp. 1965).
348ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 67 (1958).
373 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 67 (1960, Supp. 1966). Several states have
adopted the new language. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.64 (Supp. 1966).
'81OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.79(B) (Page 1964).
"49IOwA CODE § 496A.138 (1962).
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tinues to be guaranteed when any class would be entitled to vote.350
Virginia drops the normal two-thirds class vote, where applicable,
to a majority if the SEC "exercises jurisdiction over the proxy
statement" for the meeting called to consider the amendment.351
Thus, in Virginia an amendment may be approved for a corpora-
tion listed on an exchange or registered with the SEC by a two-
thirds vote of all shares and a majority vote of any affected class.
Presumably, the Virginia theory is that SEC-supervised disclosure
so assures a knowledgeable vote by a shareholder class that its pro-
tection is a legitimate substitute for the higher class vote. Inci-
dentally, shares disfranchised under the new Model Act provisions
are still entitled to notice of the proposed action352 and apparently to
an appraisal right.353
Secondly, the most recent statutes liberalize permissible types of
consideration used in a merger. The Model Act permits "shares or
other securities or obligations" of the surviving corporation,354 but
several states authorize "shares, bonds or other securities" of the
surviving or new corporation or "cash or other consideration to be
paid or delivered in exchange for shares of each constituent cor-
poration, or a combination thereof."33 5 The use of cash or other
securities to buy out minority interests and thus preclude a con-
tinuing equity interest, was first recognized in short-form mergers
of subsidiaries into parent corporations. 35 6 The reason for the more
350 E.g., 3 MODEL BUS. CoRP. ACT ANN. § 67 (1960, Supp. 1966); N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAw § 903 (a) (2).
"
5 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-70 (1964).
3" 3 MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. § 67 (1960, Supp. 1966).
353 3 MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. § 73 (1960).
351 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoP. ACT §§ 65 (c), 66 (c) (1953).
31E.g., N.Y. Bus. ConP LAW § 902 (a) (3).
356 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 68A (1953). Delaware sustained the
constitutionality of its short-form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (a)
(Supp. 1964), requiring a subsidiary's minority shareholders to accept cash for their
equity interests. Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d
893 (Sup. Ct. 1959). In New York, see Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y.
11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
Most new statutory revisions routinely adopt the Model Act provision authorizing
short-form mergers between parent and subsidiaries, although varying as to the
required percentage of shares owned by the parent, ranging from 90%, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (a) (Supp. 1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-518 (1964), to 95%, e.g.,
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 905 (a), to 100%, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-370 (1960).
It was announced recently that American Telephone and Telegraph Co. had decided
to merge Western Electric Company into itself under the New York statute, making
a cash payment to the 650 minority shareholders who own the outstanding 0.15%
stock interest other than AT&T's 99.85%. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 1966,
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restrictive older rule in the case of ordinary mergers or consolida-
tions is not clear, but presumably it was the fear that unwanted inter-
ests would be forced from participation in the new or surviving
enterprise. However, by authorizing, as statutes normally do, the
use of "securities or obligations" in the new or surviving corpora-
tion, a class of shareholders may be expelled as equity owners. If
they no longer have the equity owners' opportunity of unlimited
capital growth, it matters little whether cash or bonds or other
"securities or obligation" work their ouster. Moreover, while use
of cash will vitiate certain otherwise tax-free reorganizations under
the Internal Revenue Code, the use of cash in a merger or consoli-
dation, if authorized by state statute, does not entail a taxable event
under the Internal Revenue Code, except to the extent of the cash
or other boot.3 57
Finally, the new and amended statutes adopt other provisions,
most of them new to the particular jurisdiction, which authorize
parent-subsidiary mergers, abandonment of the transaction or post-
poned effectiveness, carry-over of earned surplus from constituent
into the new or surviving corporation,358 and, under the Ohio stat-
ute, certain mergers without a vote of the shareholders of the sur-
viving corporation.359
(b) Transfer of Assets: No significant developments concerning
sale of assets appear in the new statutes, other than the increasingly
frequent provision dispensing with a shareholder vote for a mort-
gage, pledge, or other security interest in corporate assets. This has
been long recognized in many states, and after the Model Act so
amended its provisions, several states followed suit.3e In line with
its merger section, the Model Act requires a two-thirds vote of
p. 9, col. 2. The dissenters, of course, have appraisal rights under N.Y. Bus. Co"P.
LAW § 910 (a) (1) (A) (i).
3" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (A), contains no express provision barring
use of "boot" in a statutory merger or consolidation, in contrast to the requirement
that a sale of assets is a tax-free reorganization only if the acquisition is "in exchange
solely for all or part of [the acquiring corporation's] ... voting stock," INT. RFv. CODE
OF 1954, § 568 (a) (1) (C). However, limitations upon the use of cash or other "boot"
in a statutory merger or consolidation inhere in the judicial "continuity of interest"
doctrines.
38 See, e.g., 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. §§ 2 (1), 19 (1960, Supp. 1966); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 517 (a) (1) (B). These statutes permit carryovers in mergers,
consolidations, or other corporate combinations via asset or stock acquisitions.
310 Owo Rv. CODE ANN. § 1701.79(A) (Page 1964).
30ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 71 (Supp. 1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. 64-801
(1966). See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 911.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
voting shares to approve an asset sale out of the normal course of
business,3 61 as do other statutes though with the usual variations. Un-
like its merger provisions, the Model Act allows "money or prop-
erty" as well as shares as consideration for assets, thereby creating
another artificial difference between mergers and asset sales. A few
states have adopted the now standard clause for abandoning an asset
sale. New York and one or two other states specify that the conven-
tional test for requiring a shareholder vote, whether an asset sale
is in or out of the course of regular business, refers to the business
"actually conducted" by the corporation,36 2 rather- than the business
authorized by the charter whether or not actually conducted at the
time.363 Availability of dissenters' appraisal rights continues to vary
among the new revisions and amendments. Thus, de facto merger
problems remain whether the jurisdiction, besides appraisal rights
for mergers, denies such rights altogether in a sale of assets or grants
them to the shareholders of the selling corporation. Both Pennsyl-
vania and Ohio have attempted to deal with this problem.8 4
(c) Acquisition of Shares: The least regulated area of fusions is
what the English call a "take-over bid" through one corporation's
acquisition, attempted or consummated, of a controlling block of
shares in another corporation. The groundwork for such acquisi-
tions is the generally conferred statutory power to acquire the shares
of other corporations. However, no American statutes (Ohio aside)
have any provisions for a right to vote by shareholders of the acquir-
ing corporation on a proposed stock acquisition. Some incidental
controls exist if the acquiring corporation does not have a supply
of unissued shares and must secure newly authorized shares to effect
the stock acquisition, but this is no help if the corporation does not
disclose its intended use of the new shares or does so in vague and
general terms. Furthermore, the use of cash for such a purpose is
wholly within the discretion of the acquiring corporation's direc-
tors. Whatever form of consideration is used, and however great
the changes effected by the transaction, shareholders have no voting
rights or dissenters' rights. Here, as with a sale of assets, the de
81 S MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACr ANN. § 72(c) (Supp. 1966).
"' N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 909 (a).
"' The New York Court of Appeals reached this curious result in Eisen v. Post,
3 N.Y.2d 518, 146 N.E.2d 779 (1957). Since most statutes, including the Model Act,
lack the qualifying phrase, they are susceptible to the Eisen v. Post interpretation.
110 See notes 390-91, 396-400 infra and accompanying text.
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facto merger doctrine may be judicially applied, but its application
is infrequent and unsettling.
An important English statute relevant to stock acquisitions pro-
vokes surprisingly little American interest despite the flurry of such
transactions in the United States. Under Companies Act section
209, a corporation inviting tenders of another corporation's shares
may, after acquiring rights to ninety per cent of the sought shares,
compel the non-assenting minority to sell their shares at the offering
price.0 5 The minority shareholders have a corresponding right to
force the acquiring corporation to take in their shares.308 The stat-
ute does not apply to offers for less than all of the outstanding
shares of the company (or a class of such shares) 3 7 or to offers
made at different terms to different shareholders.3 6 The ninety
per cent test is figured only against the shares held by disinterested
owners, thereby excluding those held or controlled by the acquiring
corporation.30 9 Either the minority shareholder or the acquiring
corporation may obtain court enforcement against the other.
The theory of the English statute is that, absent the acquiring
corporation's power of compulsory acquisition, a minority could
block the majority by refusing to accept the offer, and that in all
events a potentially annoying minority interest would remain out-
standing. The procedure is defended as a device which would en-
courage a fair and equal price to all parties, rather than permit ex-
change purchases and private deals at varying prices with some
sellers doing better than others.
A statute of this type may well have a useful role if we view
mergers, asset sales, and majority share acquisitions as three differ-
ent means of achieving the same end and as therefore deserving
parity so far as fair and practical. Under existing statutes, a defi-
nite percentage of shareholders of the constituent companies in a
merger and of the selling corporation in an asset sale consolidation
may bind dissenters subject only to the latter's cash appraisal rights.
In these two situations, the surviving or the purchasing corporation
005 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 209 (1).
""Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 209(2) (b).
11" Companies Act, 1948, 11 &, 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 209(1). Actually, it is not certain
that statutory remedy is available only for offers for all shares, as the Jenkins
Committee noted in urging .that the statute be clarified. Company Law Committee,
Report, CmD. No. 1749, at 105 (1962).
8 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 88, § 209 (1) (a).
300 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 88, § 209 (1).
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achieves full control of the other corporation or its assets, with
minorities handled by appraisal proceedings. Also, under recent
statutes, shareholders may be excluded from a "continuity of inter-
est" in the fused enterprises by the simple expedient of using bonds
or cash for purchasing assets or effecting a merger. Whether or not
this policy is a good one, it is increasingly authorized. The issue
thus is whether, in a share acquisition, the results of a majority
decision (in this case, the decision of a majority of the selling share-
holders) should bind all in favor of the acquiring corporation. This
is no more an expropriation than occurs in mergers and asset sales,
especially when the selling corporation distributes the considera-
tion received by it to its shareholders in dissolution.
Assuming that such a statute fits into a rational scheme of laws
for corporate fusions, the English prototype insufficiently protects a
dissenting minority. First, the statute possibly applies to an offer
for less than all shares, so that the acquiring corporation can force
its will on ten per cent of the shares it seeks-a point which the
Jenkins Committee would correct. 70 Secondly, while the statute al-
lows court action by either the shareholders (to force buyout) or
the acquiring corporation (to compel sellout), no standard of value
has been developed, other than the terms accepted by the majority
of the shares. This assumes that because many have accepted, the
price must be fair-an argument echoing the attitude of some courts
towards forcing a minority of preferred shares to accept a scale-
down of their dividend arrearages. Thirdly, since judicial power
to revise or vary an offer's terms discriminates against those who
accepted an offering price different from the court's, a statute should
empower the court to require a uniform price for all shares, treat-
ing alike those initially acquired and those forcibly sold at the
court-approved price.371
(d) Statutes and the De Facto Merger Problem: The most ad-
vanced developments in the corporate fusion area are the product
of judicial application of the de facto merger doctrine. Because of
the disparity between relatively strict statutory rules governing
mergers and the more lenient provisions applicable to sales of assets
and because of the almost total absence of regulation of fusions via
170 See note 367 supra.
371 Companies Code 1961, §§ 234-35 (Ghana) does incorporate most of these
changes, which are also consistent with Jenkins Committee recommendations. Com-
pany Law Committee, Report, CMD. No. 1749, at 105-10 (1962).
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buying and selling controlling share interests, corporate lawyers un-
derstandably prefer the more "flexible" procedures. Some courts
have treated this as morally reprehensible and have therefore ap-
plied to asset sales or share acquisitions the tough merger require-
ments. The number of cases is few but they are significant in their
total impact.3 7 2 They are a threat to the certainty businessmen and
corporate lawyers supposedly venerate, since (1) most states have
not passed on the question either pro or con, and (2) those states
which have adopted or hinted at the de facto merger doctrine have
developed no criteria making its application vel non readily or even
remotely predictable in a given fact situation. Only those states
which have firmly rejected the application of merger rules to asset
sales or share acquisitions have achieved any certainty; but this has
simply meant that in such jurisdictions, the stricter merger rules
with their presumed protection for shareholder interests may be
evaded by recourse to asset sales or share acquisitions with or with-
out a dissolution of the acquired corporation or the subsidiary, how-
ever much the transaction functionally and operationally resembles
a merger.
This is not the occasion to debate the wisdom of either posi-
tion. This briefly sketched picture is background for the several
statutes which, with varying degrees of foresight and effectiveness,
respond to the de facto merger problem, which can no longer be
ignored. Statutes of four states will be examined.
North Carolina: North Carolina's pioneer statute was the first
to deal with the problem. And it is a problem under the North
Carolina statute, which in most cases requires for merger a majority
vote of all outstanding shares (voting and non-voting) of all cor-
porations participating in the merger 73 and grants appraisal rights
to all dissenters.374 However, the statute requires a two-thirds vote
of all shares (voting and non-voting) for a sale of assets.3 7 5 As usual
in these statutes, it does not regulate the acts of the purchasing
172 The de facto merger decisions are analyzed in Folk, De Facto Mergers in Dela-
ware: Haditon v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. RFv. 1261 (1963). Comments on
the same topic in a local context apear in Folk, Corporations, 16 S.C.L. REV. 60
(1963) (South Carolina); and Folk, Revisiting the North Carolinr Corporation Law,
43 N.C.L. Rav. 768, 856-59 (1965). A recent case is Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136
N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965).
o,3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-108(b) (1965). A majority class vote is guaranteed in
appropriate circumstances.
3'7'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(b) (1965).
3'7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(c)(3) (1965).
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corporation, nor is there anything regulating sale and purchase of
controlling shares. Thus, the disparity of regulation could invite
de facto merger contentions in an appropriate case, although an
asset sale is somewhat less attractive because of the state's reverse
twist of requiring a higher shareholder vote to sell assets than to
merge. 37 6
The North Carolina statute does offer a neat solution to at least
one problem. While retaining the two-thirds vote for sale of assets
for shares of another corporation, it gives dissenters' appraisal rights
to the shareholders of the corporation selling its assets "for, or sub-
stantially for, shares of another corporation, foreign or domestic."
8 7
However, this single provision hardly reduces the disparity among
fusion techniques which invites judicial intervention. For one
thing, under such a statute, a court could still hold that the sale
of assets for shares was "really" a merger and that the transaction
should be set aside since there was no vote by or dissenters' ap-
praisal rights for shareholders of the purchasing corporation. Sec-
ondly, since the statute in no wise benefits shareholders of either
the acquiring or acquired corporation when the transaction takes
the form of a majority stock acquisition, the way is still open for
de facto merger doctrines. The risk is enhanced since, arguably in
the case of an asset sale for shares, the court might well hold pre-
emptive the apparent legislative policy of allowing fusion through
this method with only the seller's shareholders having voting and
dissenters' rights.
Connecticut: The Connecticut approach is inspired by North
Carolina's but develops along different lines. The basic pattern is
that a merger requires a two-thirds vote of all shareholders (voting
and non-voting), 78 and dissenters in participating corporations have
appraisal rights with one crucial exception.8 79 A sale of assets re-
M The reverse is presently true in Delaware. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 251 (c) (Supp. 1964) ("two-thirds of the total number of shares of its capital stock"
to approve a merger) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (Supp. 1964) ("majority of
the stock issued and outstanding having voting power" required for sale of assets).
'"7 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-113 (a) (1), (b) (1965). Presumably, the term "shares" as
used here includes both voting and non-voting shares. The North Carolina statute
recognizes no appraisal rights if assets are sold for consideration other than "shares."378 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-366 (b) (1960).
370 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 83-373 (c) (1960) (dissenting shareholder of surviving
corporation has appraisal rights only if merger effects amendment of certificate of
incorporation).
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quires a like two-thirds vote of all shareholders. 80 Thus, Connecti-
cut eliminates a disparity which exists in the North Carolina statute
as to the required vote. It also refines the North Carolina rule that
if assets are sold "primarily" for "securities" of another corporation
and if "such transaction is part of a general plan of liquidation and
distribution essentially equivalent to a merger," then any special
vote provisions applicable to mergers shall apply to the sale of assets
for securities; 31 any of the selling corporation's shareholders dissent-
ing from this kind of transaction have appraisal rights.38 2 The
Connecticut provision is an "improvement" over North Carolina if
one feels that certainty is gained by distinguishing between asset
sales for securities which are, and those which are not, "part of a
general plan . . . essentially equivalent to a merger." In practice,
however, the comprehensive North Carolina rule is more certain
and easier to administer. Moreover, Connecticut, like North Caro-
lina, leaves unresolved the question of voting and appraisal rights
of the shareholders of the purchasing corporation; so that again a
de facto merger problem exists if a court is convinced that the
transaction is one calling for protection of the purchasing corpora-
tion's shareholders.
While Connecticut, like North Carolina, recognizes no voting
or appraisal rights for shareholders of the purchasing corporation,
de facto merger possibilities, clearly present in the North Carolina
scheme, are avoided by additional Connecticut provisions achieving
a considerable parity of procedure between mergers and sales of
assets. First, the merger statute dispenses with any vote of the share-
holders of the surviving corporation under specified circumstances3 3
and withdraws appraisal rights,3 4 thus reducing the incentive to
invoke the de facto merger doctrine. Secondly, at the other end of
the scale, the requirement that the shareholders of a corporation
selling its assets under a "general plan . . . essentially equivalent
to a merger" shall possess the same voting and dissenters' rights
as the shareholders of a merging corporation achieves parity simply
0'o CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 83-372 (d) (Supp. 1965).
381 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-372(e) (Supp. 1965). There is also a cross-relation
between this section and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-366(b) (1) (ii) (1960).
3' CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-373 (1960).
'8' CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-566 (b) (2) (1960).
8 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-373 (c) (1960).
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by absorbing the judicial de facto merger rule into the statute it-
self.
3 8 5
-Thus, with qualifications, it can be said that Connecticut marks
an advance if parity is the prime test of progress in this area. Yet,
it does leave untouched a possible application of the de facto merger
doctrine to a purchase and sale of controlling shares followed by a
merger-like absorption of the now controlled subsidiary.
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania's handling of the de facto merger
issue was a direct response to Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,810 in which
the court held an ostensible sale of corporate assets for shares of
the purchaser to be in substance a merger, and proceeded to set
aside the transaction for failure to comply with the merger statutes
giving the appraisal right to dissenting shareholders.387 The 1959
amendments to the Pennsylvania statute granted appraisal rights to
dissenting shareholders of a purchasing corporation if the acquisi-
tion involved the purchaser's issuing fifty per cent or more of the
voting shares outstanding after the acquisition; 8s8 but a 1963 amend-
ment changed the test to whether the newly issued voting shares
could elect a majority of the directors of the issuing corporation.8 9
As an ad hoc response, the Pennsylvania statute leaves unresolved
at least as many problems as the North Carolina statute. The 1959
and 1963 amendments deal only with appraisal rights. Thus, while
shareholders of each merging corporation and shareholders of a sell-
ing corporation act by a majority of voting shares, 9 0 and dissenters
have appraisal rights, 91 the statute does not recognize voting rights
for shareholders of the purchasing corporation even if a control
block of its shares are issued in the acquisition. To that extent,
then, openings remain for the de facto merger doctrine. Moreover,
none of the Pennsylvania amendments deals at all with majority
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-372 (e) (Supp. 1965), 373 (d) (1960).
's 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
387Alternatively, the court held that the sale of assets was an "upside-down"
transaction in which the nominal purchaser was the real seller, and vice versa. On
this basis, the court was able alternatively to justify awarding appraisal rights to
the shareholders of the nominal purchaser by treating it as the real seller and
applying the Pennsylvania statute granting appraisal rights to shareholders of the
selling corporation.
388 Pa. Laws 1959, No. 1406, § 1.
380 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2852-311 (F), -908 (C) (Supp. 1966).
390 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2852-311 (B) (Supp. 1966) (vote on assets sale), -902 (C)
(Supp. 1966) (vote on merger).
311 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2852-311 (D) (Supp. 1966) (sale of assets), -908 (A)
(1958) (merger).
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stock acquisitions, either to give a vote or dissenters' rights to share-
holders of the acquiring corporation. Again, lack of parity leaves
interstices for judicial intervention.
Ohio: Ohio alone has undertaken to treat all three methods of
corporate fusion as different means to the same end and, regardless
of the method chosen, to give to shareholders of the acquiring cor-
poration the same protection which hitherto has been available only
for shareholders of the surviving corporation in a merger. The
policies of parity and shareholder protection are well, although not
completely, served.
The three traditional methods are (1) merger or consolidation;
(2) "majority share acquisition," defined as the acquisition by an
Ohio corporation or its subsidiary of a majority of shares of another
corporation, in exchange for voting shares of the Ohio corpora-
tion;392 and (3) "combination," defined as a transaction (other than
a merger or consolidation) involving an Ohio corporation's acquisi-
tion of all or substantially all assets of another corporation, in
exchange for voting shares of the Ohio corporation or of the foreign
parent corporation of an Ohio subsidiary which receives the assets. 893
For such transactions, the following rules-stated without their
exceptions and limitations-are fashioned. The basic test is whether
or not one-sixth or more of the voting shares are issued by the
acquiring corporation in a "combination" or "majority share acqui-
sition" or by the surviving corporation in a merger. If in any of
these three instances, fewer than one-sixth of the voting shares are
issued, then the transaction need not be approved by the share-
holders of the acquiring corporation (in a combination or majority
share acquisition)394 or of the surviving corporation (in a merg-
er);8 93 and the shareholders of these corporations have no dissenters'
appraisal rights.396 Conversely, if one-sixth or more of the voting
302 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01 (R) (Page 1964). The phrase "majority of
shares" is my own and is used in lieu of the precise but lengthy statutory language,
"shares of a corporation, 'domestic or foreign,' entitling the holder thereof to exercise
a majority of the voting power in the election of directors of such corporation .... "
83, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01 (Q) (Page 1964). Definitions of "parent," "sub-
sidiary," "transferee corporation," "transferor corporation," and "acquiring corpora-
tion" appear in OHIO RIv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01 (P) - (S) (Page 1964).
80' OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.84 (A) (Page Supp. 1965).
"05 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.79 (A) (2) (Page 1964). In the case of a merger,
excusing a shareholder vote is contingent on meeting six other conditions as well as
the quantum of voting shares issued. These conditions preserve unchanged the
internal organization and basic documents of the surviving corporation.
398 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (A) (Page 1964) (by implication).
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shares are issued in any one of the three transactions, the share-
holders of the acquiring or surviving corporation have the right to
vote by a two-thirds vote,8 97 and dissenters have appraisal rights.88
It should be stressed that this test applies only to the shareholders
of the acquiring or surviving corporation. Thus, in a merger, share-
holders of all constituent corporations other than the survivor are
entitled to voting and appraisal rights;389 and shareholders of the
selling corporation have like voting and appraisal rights.400 Voting
rights are defined throughout as two-thirds of the voting sharehold-
ers, thereby eliminating different results depending upon the choice
of method of fusion.
The Ohio statute certainly does the best job to date of dealing
with the de facto merger problem. It eliminates the major source
of trouble by giving complete parity to shareholders of the acquir-
ing or surviving corporations, both as to vote and dissenters' rights.
For the transactions with which it deals, it is certainly completely
pre-emptive of any interstitial common law innovations along de
facto merger lines. Thorough as it is, the situations with which it
does not deal should be pointed out. First, it does not include acqui-
sitions of all or substantially all assets of another corporation or of a
majority block of shares of another corporation, if the consideration
is cash, creditor securities, preferred stock, property, or, in general,
anything other than the issuer's voting shares.4 1 But if the transac-
tion took the form of a statutory merger under statutes allowing
almost any kind of consideration to be used, voting and dissenters'
rights would arise.4 02 To that extent, then, different consequences
397 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.79 (B) (Page 1964) (voting rights on merger),
.84 (A) (2) (Page Supp. 1965) (voting rights on combination or majority share acquisi.
tion). In each case, the two-thirds vote may be reduced by the articles of incor-
poration to a majority.
38 OHio RiEv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.81 (B) (Page Supp. 1965) (appraisal rights on
merger), .84(D) (Page Supp. 1965) (appraisal right on combination or on majority
share acquisition).
309 OHIO R v. CoDE ANN. §§ 1701.79 (B) (Page 1964) (voting rights), .81 (B) (Page
Supp. 1965) (appraisal rights).
100 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.76 (A) (2) (Page 1964) (two-thirds or majority if
articles permit), .76 (C) (Page 1964) (appraisal rights). It should be noted that ap-
praisal rights, where applicable in either a merger or sale of assets, run to the share-
holders of all classes entitled to receive notice of the meeting, whether or not
entitled to vote.
40" This results from the definitions of "combination" and "majority share acquisi-
tion" which both refer to the consideration as voting shares, either of the corporation
or a parent. Omo R~v. CoDE ANN. §§ 1701.01 (Q), (R) (Page 1964).
402 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.78 (B) (10) (Page 1964) broadly specifies permissible
types of consideration which may pass in a merger.
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could ensue. If the statute's theory is the elimination of every possi-
ble occasion for a court to sneak in the de facto merger doctrine,
of course, it fails here, although realistically the courts are not very
likely to be much worried by a transaction using other than voting
shares. If, as is more likely, the statute's theory is to give share-
holders a voice in connection with a major dilution of their equity
interest, then its policy is not offended even if the transaction smells
like a merger in all respects save the use of voting shares. Related
to this is Professor Herwitz's point that the Ohio statute does not
cover a transaction in which a corporation sells a more-than-one-
sixth block of voting shares for cash which it then uses to acquire
assets or stock of another corporation, although a direct issue of
the voting shares would come under the statute.40 3 If the anti-dilu-
tion theory of the statute is accurate, then this subterfuge trans-
action is offensive to its policy; but many other considerations come
into play before one can approve an automatic extension of the
statutory coverage to the situation Herwitz posits. 40 4
Again, the Ohio statute does not apply, even though the acquir-
ing corporation issues one-sixth or more of its voting shares, if the
transaction involves an acquisition of less than a majority of the
shares of another corporation or less than "all or substantially all"
assets of another corporation.415 Applying the anti-dilution theory
of the statute, it is clearly inadequate in its coverage, since the
equity owner's interest is just as much diluted if all or less than
all assets are purchased or if fifty per cent or twenty per cent of
the shares of another corporation are acquired.
Finally, the statute does not purport to apply to the "upside-
down" situation where, in a purchase and sale of all or substantially
all assets or of a majority of shares of another corporation, the nomi-
nal purchaser is the real seller. Stated otherwise, the Ohio statute
(like the Pennsylvania amendments) does not deal with the problem
presented by the alternative holding of the Farris case. This is just
as well since the chances of stating any workable test of an "upside-
down" transaction would be almost impossible.
In sum, the Ohio statute is the most thoughtful effort to date
40 3 HERWITZ, MATERIALS ON THE PLANNING OF CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 723 (1966).
404 HERwrrz, op. cit. supra note 403, does not argue that the statute should cover
the situation he poses, but that to do so presents "some pretty testing questions in
this area."
08 Again, this follows from restrictions in the definitions in OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1701.01 (Q), (R) (Page 1964).
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in this area. Its coverage is adequate, except that its protection of
shareholders should extend to issues of more than one-sixth of the
shares for acquisitions of less than all assets or less than a majority
of shares of another corporation. The other areas of non-coverage
are too infrequent or tenuous to call for statutory treatment, unless
some court throws a wild card into the game.4°0
VII. CLOSE CORPORATIONS
Since many recent statutory provisions in aid of close corpora-
tions have been authoritatively discussed by others,40 7 this article
need only highlight several features less frequently noticed. Some
states fail to deal effectively with close corporation problems be-
cause they have adopted almost verbatim the Model Act, which so
tardily and even reluctantly recognized these issues.408 On the other
hand, Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, Wyoming, and Flori-
da40 9 (in order of enactment of their statutes) have taken significant
steps along the path first blazed by North Carolina in 1955. Various
statutory provisions bearing on close corporations have been ex-
amined elsewhere in this article. Three important topics remain for
brief comment.
406After two opinions in the same jurisdiction construed appraisal right statutes to
enable a shareholder of record to vote some beneficially owned shares for, others
against, proposed corporate action and still obtain appraisal rights for the dissenting
beneficial owners, Reynolds Metals Co. v. Colonial Realty Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 515,
185 A.2d 754 (Ch. 1962), aff'd, 41 Del. Ch. 177, 190 A.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1963), several
states specifically authorized such a split vote. Bache & Co. v. General Instrument
Corp., 74 N.J. Super. 92, 180 A.2d 535, certif. denied, 88 N.J. 181, 183 A.2d 87 (1962);
e.g., 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 73 (1960, Supp. 1966); N.Y. Bus. COR. LAW
§ 623 (d). Various statutes spell out with particularity rights of a shareholder after he
has elected to dissent, e.g., to dividend withdrawal. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. CORP. ACr
ANN. art. 5.13 (1956). Statutes usually include a clause purporting to make the
appraisal remedy exclusive, whether or not in fact exercised by the shareholder.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-373 (1) (1960); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 98
(Supp. 1965).
407 Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More and
Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145 (1966); O'Neal, Developments in the Regula-
tion of the Close Corporation, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 641 (1965).
,o8As of today, the Model Act, 3 MODEL Bus. CoR. Acr ANN. (1960, Supp. 1966),
recognizes informal action by shareholders, § 138, and by directors, § 39A (a very
recent "optional" section); authorizes high vote requirements, § 136; and allows a
shareholder to petition for judicial dissolution on grounds most likely to emerge in
close corporation situations, § 90. In 1962, the Model Act deleted its requirement of
three incorporators, § 47, but it has not yet authorized fewer than three directors even
for a one or two-shareholder corporation, see § 34.
409According to Dean O'Neal, the Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN, §§ 608.0100
-.0107 (Supp. 1965), is "incomplete and vaguely drawn" and fails to meet the close
corporation's "special needs that require changes in the law." O'Neal, supra note
407, at 651. See Comment, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1551 (1964).
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1. Test of "Close Corporations": Several statutes make certain
provisions applicable only to corporations no shares of which are
"listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an
over-the-counter market by one or more members of a national or
affiliated security association. '410 A more common variant of the
second part of their test is whether the shares are "regularly
quoted '411 or "generally traded." 412 The unique Florida close cor-
poration law depends upon a similarly worded definition of "close
corporation." 413 Such language no doubt aptly describes the close
corporation and, indeed, probably best describes it. However, in-
herent in this description, which purports to be a definition, is a
disturbing uncertainty in its application to practical problems and
in some of its implications. Several rhetorical questions suggest
some of the difficulties. When do shares become "regularly quoted"
or "generally traded"? Assuming arguendo that recurrent appear-
ances in the "pink sheets" can be equated with "regular quota-
tions," no such event signals the beginning of "general trading" in
the shares. In any event, during the twilight zone when the close
corporation mysteriously transmutes itself into a non-close (if not
yet wholly public) enterprise, there may be delicate problems as to
rights and liabilities. For instance, where a director restriction agree-
ment is valid only so long as shares are not "regularly quoted" or
"generally traded," who will be liable for action or inaction during
this period-the restricted directors or the restricting shareholders?
Once the shares have unquestionably come to be "regularly
quoted" or "generally traded," does it follow that all agreements
or arrangements which were valid while the corporation was "dose"
are now unenforceable? Substantively, this would be unfortunate,
for certain arrangements which are most commonly found in close
corporations may still be useful (or at least not harmful) in other
companies whose shares are beginning to find a limited public mar-
ket. This would be true, for instance, of various stock transfer
restrictions and some management agreements. Once the corpora-
tion loses its status under the definition, should not a purchaser of
shares with a conspicuous certificate notation of the fact of an agree-
,10 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 620 (c) (authorizing certain restrictions by share-
holder agreement upon discretion of directors).
,""S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.22 (c) (Supp. 1965).
1"2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (b) (1965).
41F LA. STAT. ANN. § 608.0100 (2) (Supp. 1965).
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ment or restriction be bound, while another purchaser who knows
nothing of such arrangement be relieved of any duty? It would seem
more fruitful to focus on means and devices of informing purchasers
of arrangements which are unusual or unique rather than to assume
that once public trading begins, all or many types of restrictions
must ipso facto be invalidated.
While this degree of uncertainty may be tolerated if only one
statutory provision or right depended upon such a "test," it would
seem undesirable to ground an entire close corporation statute, even
if merely "permissive" like Florida's, on such shifting sands. It may
be time to explore the possibilities of a definition in more definite
but possibly arbitrary terms, such as the number of shareholders
or some like objective determinants. This is no fantasy. Subchapter
S of the Internal Revenue Code already uses as its touchstone the
fact of ten shareholders plus certain subordinate criteria not rele-
vant here.414 Given the many corporations annually qualifying
under these provisions, 415 this means that hard money is staked on
the assumption that the definition is workable and, in particular,
that the corporation can maintain its Subchapter S status through
continuing compliance with the standards. A somewhat similar test
is used in at least two American corporation statutes which author-
ize certain stock transfer restrictions so long as there are no more
than twenty shareholders. 416 Of particular interest in this connec-
tion is the Puerto Rican statute which authorizes a corporation with
no more than eleven shareholders to dispense altogether with the
board of directors and manage the corporate affairs directly or
through a managing agent or officer. 417
The greatest fund of experience upon which to construct an
alternate test of "dose corporation" comes from English and Com-
monwealth statutes defining a "private company" by three criteria:
11 Section 1371 of the Internal Revenue Code, besides requiring that the corpora-
tion have no more than ten shareholders, also bars shareholders other than indi-
viduals and estates, and limits the corporation to a single class of stock. INT. REV.
CODE or 1954, § 1371 (a). Stock owned by husband and wife jointly or as community
property is deemed owned by only one shareholder. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 (c).
"2 In 1963, more than 105,000 corporations elected "Subchapter S treatment."
STEvENs & HENN, CASES ON COPEORATIONS 800 (1965).
,-Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.32 (d) (1965) authorizes "consent" restraints on trans-
fer "provided that all the shares of the corporation are owned beneficially and of
record by not more than twenty shareholders." TEx. Bus. CoRP. Aar ANN. art.
2.22 (B) (2) (1956), authorizes buy-and-sell agreements "so long as there are no more
than twenty (20) holders of record" of the class of shares subject to such restrictions.
417 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14, § 1102 (C) (1962).
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(l)fifty or fewer shareholders; (2) all shares restricted as to trans-
fer; and (3) public issuance of shares or debentures forbidden by the
corporation's articles. 418 Like Subchapter S, the English Companies
Act resolves some of the problems of losing status. While these solu-
tions are not the only possible ones, the greater precision of the
number-of-shareholders test makes it possible to construct procedures
for dealing with voluntary or involuntary loss of status. The con-
ventional American test of "regularly quoted" or "generally traded"
shares simply does not lend itself to such objective and reasonably
predictable solutions. Thus, under the English Companies Act, if
a company decides to "go public," in the limited sense of ceasing
to be a "private company," it may do so by filing certain docu-
ments.4 19 Inadvertent loss of status is harder to deal with, but the
English statute vests courts with broad authority to relieve the cor-
poration of the consequences of non-compliance on finding inad-
vertence or "some other sufficient cause."420 Under the Puerto Rican
statute, if the corporation comes to have more than the stated num-
ber of shareholders, it must act within four months either to reduce
the number of shareholders to the number recited within the certifi-
cate, amend the articles to specify the new number (still eleven or
fewer), or altogether eliminate the stated number in which event
it must undertake to elect directors and appoint officers. Failure to
comply means that all parties in the corporation, including share-
holders and agents, become liable as partners for corporate obliga-
tions.421
In short, the number-of-shareholders test, which has been so
widely used in British and Commonwealth statutes to demarcate
the line between private and public companies and which is now
used in the Puerto Rican statute to some extent and in the Internal
Revenue Code, has a precision and definitude which cannot be
readily obtained under the currently favored test in American state
statutes. To use the number-of-shareholders criterion as the basis
for a close corporation status will require exceptionally careful and
percipient statutory draftsmanship, but the task is one worth under-
taking.
2. Stock Transfer Restrictions: Recently, at least three states-
Connecticut, Wyoming, and Arkansas-have taken significant statu-
418 Companies Act, 1948, 11 8: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 28 (1).
410 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 30 (1).
420 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 29.
'11 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14, § 1102 (c) (1962).
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tory steps to clarify and enlarge the area of permissible stock trans-
fer restrictions.422 At common law, one can be reasonably certain of
the validity only of first option and buy-and-sell arrangements. 423 In
only a few jurisdictions can one be confident of the validity of a
restriction requiring directors' assent to a proposed stock sale, and
then the limits of reasonableness which must govern the directors'
giving or denying their consent are not well defined if only because
of the sparse judicial authority. Overhanging any novel or unusual
approach, even if warranted by good business reasons, is the prop-
erty law doctrine condemning restraints on alienation.
Among the statutes, Wyoming has the most complete provision
to date. It first validates restrictions "in the nature of an option or
options or refusal or refusals on any shares," regardless of the num-
ber of shareholders. 42 It next authorizes a restriction "imposed by
a buy-and-sell agreement" if all shareholders are parties to the re-
striction and all shares are owned beneficially and of record by
fewer than twenty shareholders. It is not clear why such limitations
need be imposed on a buy-and-sell agreement, but both Wyoming
and an earlier Texas statute do so. 425 Most importantly, Wyoming
validates a restriction "conditioning the right to voluntarily sell or
transfer shares upon the prior consent of the directors or upon the
prior consent of all or a portion of the shareholders" if all shares
are owned beneficially and of record by twenty or fewer sharehold-
ers.426 The limitation here seems appropriate, for this type of re-
striction, particularly as it is worded, should not be available in a
larger corporation. In all events, it is assumed that the directors or
shareholders must act reasonably in withholding consent.
Connecticut does not attempt to specify the types of valid re-
strictions, but negatively upholds restrictions "not otherwise illegal"
adopted either by by-law or by agreement and applicable either to
"
22N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(c) (1965) contains a general authorization for the
by-laws to include "any provisions for regulation and management of the affairs of
the corporation, including the transfer of its shares, and restrictions on such transfer,
not inconsistent with the law or the charter." Such a provision on stock transfer
restrictions can be read narrowly or restrictively. Happily, North Carolina has a
"liberal" attitude towards transfer restrictions. See Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182
N.C. 308, 108 S.E. 744 (1921) (upholding "consent" transfer restriction).
128 Certainty as to the validity of buy-and-sell agreements is rather unclear in
some jurisdictions.
424 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.32 (b) (1965).
'
23 TEx. Bus. CoRP. Acr art. 2.22 (B) (2) (1965); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.32 (c)
(1965).
112Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.32(d) (1965).
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those shares voting for the by-law or to those party to the agreement.
These restrictions also apply to any shares subsequently issued if so
provided in the by-law or agreement.42 7 The use of the "not other-
wise illegal" phrase is unfortunate. It leaves an opening for judicial
restrictiveness, since there is case law (although not necessarily in
Connecticut) treating almost every type of restriction as "illegal"
at some time or other. Unless a jurisdiction is known to have an
exceptionally liberal view of stock transfer restrictions, the phrase
is dangerous or, at least as bad, uncertain and unpredictable in its
application to particular restrictions.
The Arkansas statute apparently is intended primarily as an
enabling provision codifying the common law rule.428 It authorizes
share transfer restrictions "that do not unreasonably restrain aliena-
tion," and includes "purchase options" and "a prior offering to the
corporation or to one or more of its shareholders, at a fair price"
before transferred outside the corporate family.4 29 Unlike Wyoming,
it does not in terms include consent arrangements. 4 0 It is also
broader than other statutes in authorizing restrictions on transfers
inter vivos and by inheritance or testamentary gift, and "hypotheca-
tion or other disposition" of the shares. 481 For shares yet to be issued,
the restrictions must appear in the articles or by-laws and be con-
spicuously noted on the certificate;432 for outstanding shares, the
owner's consent is required.
These statutes make a beginning, but they do not go far enough
to accommodate adequately the needs of the close corporation. It
is evident that they would not authorize an absolute restraint on
alienation even for a limited time period, nor is it clear that they
427 CONN. GF-N. STAT. ANN. § 33-306 (a) (1960). Shares issued subsequent to an agree-
ment containing a stock transfer restriction are subject to the restriction if the agree-
ment was accepted by shareholders who had sufficient voting power to adopt a by-law
to that effect. Thus, in this instance, the statute interestingly eliminates any func-
,tional distinction between a shareholder agreement and a by-law provision.
28Am. STAT. ANN. § 64-211 (1966). The Corporation Law Revision Committee's
Note to this section states that "there might as well be some statutory authority"
for by-law provisions creating stock transfer restrictions since "lawyers are often
asked to prepare" then.,
"2ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-211(A) (1966).
430 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-211 (C) (1966) states that nothing in the statute precludes
a shareholder from making 'a "personal contract or agreement" containing restrictions
"that do not unreasonably restrain alienation," but it is difficult to see what this adds
to the general authority to make restrictions under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-211(A)
(1966).
4'A, K. STAT. ANN. § 64-211(A) (1966).
''82AnK. STAT. ANN. § 64-211(B) (1966).
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would validate the lesser restriction of barring transfer of restricted
securities to designated persons or classes of persons. It would be
welcome to see statutes expressly recognize restrictions not only on
a transfer in the sense of a sale or other disposition of the security,
but in the sense of "transfer on the books." Such a restraint on
registration of transfer (to adopt Uniform Commercial Code lan-
gnage)4" is needed both for close corporations and for sales of
securities under a "private placement" or "intrastate" exemption in
state or federal securities laws.43 4 It is also worth noting that, except
for Connecticut, no statutes deal with restrictions on securities other
than shares, but it may be vitally necessary to control the disposition
of convertible bonds, debentures, or (much more rarely) preferred
shares and the shares into which they may be converted. Finally,
one of the subtle dangers of statutes such as Wyoming's is that they
might be deemed pre-emptive of restrictions not explicitly covered
by the statute's terms. At least Connecticut avoids that problem,
whatever other difficulties it creates, by the broad phrase "other-
wise lawful." It would be better, however, to-ist-permissibleforms
of stock transfer restrictions and theh--add-an--aussa4ng other
restrictions which may be lawful.
3. Remedies on Deadlock: The conventional remedy for dead-
lock is dissolution ordered at the discretion of the court. As Model
Act section 90,435 it has found its way into all of the new corpora-
tion law revisions, usually with variations although with its basic
concepts unchanged. It seems generally accepted by commentators
that ready dissolution on deadlock is desirable,430 although courts
have been noticeably hesitant to order the remedy even when the
statute broadly empowers them.437 The courts may well be more
perceptive than the writers, for their reluctance suggests their recog-
nition that dissolution irrevocably ends a formerly viable concern,
which might have been revived if the corporation's life had con-
tinued and the deadlock broken. In general, the judicial opinions
indicate a deep disquiet and disinclination to rely too much on
dissolution as the way out. Hence, those states which have in one
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-102 (1) (c), -106, -401.
's' Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3-4, 48 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17c-d (1964).
43 ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 90 (1953).
'" See, e.g., Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence-Problems of Dead-
lock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 778 (1952).
'
8 7 See, e.g., Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Ore. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959).
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way or another provided alternative remedies have made a consider-
able advance over those which give courts (and counsel) only the
choice between dissolution or no dissolution. Three such alterna-
tive remedies which are found in a few of the new statutes are
briefly noted.
(a) Provisional Director: California's familiar procedure for ap-
pointing a provisional director43 -once unique to that state but now
adopted in Missouri 439-is perhaps the least drastic remedy since it
touches symptoms rather than causes. Under this statute's wording,
given a deadlock of an evenly divided board, half of the directors
or one-third of the shareholders may petition for a court order
designating an "impartial person" to serve as director until he is
removed by the court or ousted by a majority of the shareholders.
The provisional director is vested with all powers of the other direc-
tors, including the rights to notice, to attend meetings, and to vote.
This procedure is essentially a means of compelling the warring
shareholders and directors to accept a type of arbitration. The dead-
lock-breaking director acts independently and presumably for the
best interests of the corporation, as those interests are viewed by an
outsider. The statute assumes that his supposedly dispassionate ap-
proach, unwarped by prior involvement in the internecine strife,440
will enable him to work with the other parties towards a resolution
of the conflict, and having done so, that he will bow out without
permanently altering the balance of power within the corporation.
The supposed advantages of this remedy are thus predicated both
upon his power to cast a deciding vote to break deadlocks on the
director level and upon his persuasiveness in pressing new ideas or
alternatives or by acting as mediator or conciliator.
As suggested, the remedy goes to symptoms primarily, although
possibly the deadlock-breaking votes of a provisional director may
so change the direction of corporate activity that deadlock will not
recur. However, this may be too hopeful, for in many cases, the
matrix of the deadlock may be the incompatibility of the principals
or of their ideas; and in this situation the provisional director may
only postpone the day when more drastic remedies must be invoked.
""a CAL. COR'. CODE § 819.
430 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323 (Supp. 1965).
"0Both the California and Missouri statutes provide that the appointee must
not be either a shareholder or creditor of the corporation nor related within the
third degree to any other director6 or oflicers of the corporation,
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(b) Compulsory Buyout of Shares: Going well beyond the pro-
visional director is the court-ordered buyout of a dissenting stock-
holder.441 This remedy was first clearly established in England
under section 210 of the Companies Act,442 and it has been adopted
throughout the Commonwealth.443 In general, section 210 empowers
the court to exercise broad powers in granting relief whenever it
finds that dissolution is appropriate but that dissolution would prej-
udice one or more shareholder groups. In such a case the court
may order, among other forms of relief, "the purchase of the shares
of any members of the company by other members of the company
or by the company. .. " at a fair price fixed by the court. Thus,
it resembles somewhat the shareholder appraisal remedy in a merger
or sale of assets, since money compensation is awarded for the injury
sustained. This procedure, of course, enables the majority to force
out the minority subject to court approval. However, it is not
perhaps as hard on the minority interests as a first glimpse suggests.
No doubt, the court will generously calculate "fair value" in aggra-
vated circumstances to favor the minority. Moreover, under the
English statute it is truly an alternative to dissolution since buyout
is not ordered unless dissolution would itself be appropriate. Thus,
the statute assumes that the situation is so bad that the status quo
ante is beyond restoration. Buyout is therefore preferable, for at
least it averts potential destruction of going-concern values, while
fairly treating the ousted interests. Indeed, the minority may be
glad to get out, so long as they can get a fair price, which presumably
the court will guarantee them.
Three states make the substance of this remedy available. South
Carolina does so through its adoption nearly verbatim of England's
section 210 including the power to order buyout."4 4 Connecticut's
statute"4 5 is less inclusive than the English and South Carolina pro-
""The English and Connecticut statutes considered in this section have some
vague antecedents in statutes in West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3093 (1961), and
California, CAL. CORP. CODE § 4658, which permits any holder of fifty per cent or more
of a corporation's shares to "buy off," with court approval, an action to appoint a
receiver for a corporation or to dissolve it. See Merlino v. Fresno Macaroni Mfg.
Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 462, 148 P.2d 884 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
442 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210.
.. E.g., Companies Code, 1961, § 218 (Ghana); Companies Act, Act No. 63 of 1955,
§ 209 (N.Z.); Companies Act, 1960, 9 Eliz. 2, c. 22, § 201 (No. Ireland); Companies
Act, 1962, § 186 (So. Austl.); Companies Act, 1959, § 128 (Tasmania); Companies Act,
1958, § 94 (Vict.). Similar statutes are also found in India and South Africa.
"'S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23 (Supp. 1965).
"'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384 (1960), as amended, §§ 33-384 (b), (d), (e)
(Supp. 1965).
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visions in the potential variety of court-ordered remedies, but is
more precise and comprehensive in its coverage of the possibly
tricky procedural problems inherent in the compulsory buyout.
Under the Connecticut statute, once a shareholder has sued to com-
pel dissolution of the corporation, for example, because of deadlock
or fraud, "any other shareholder" may petition the court to deter-
mine the fair value of the shares owned by the plaintiff in the
original dissolution action. Under the statute, the court "shall"
determine the fair value, using appraisers if necessary. After the
report is made on fair value, the "other shareholder" may elect to
purchase the plaintiff's shares at the appraised figure.. On depositing
funds for the purchase, the court must enter an order of sale com-
pelling the plaintiff to turn over his shares duly endorsed for trans-
fer. In 1963, Montana adopted a provision somewhat similar to
Connecticut's by authorizing the holders of fifty per cent or more of
the outstanding shares to procure dismissal of a dissolution suit by
a court-ordered purchase, at fair value, of the shares of the com-
plaining shareholder.446
Obviously, any shareholder will think twice before suing to com-
pel dissolution if he may thereby involve himself in a procedure
which will compel him to sell out his stock interest. This is especial-
ly so if he incurs a large tax, as he might if his basis is low. Hence,
the overall position of the minority shareholder may in fact be
weakened. On the other hand, if the majority interests find that
they have to buy off the suit at a large cost to themselves or face
dissolution, this may deter unconscionable conduct and perhaps ini-
tiate fruitful changes in the relationships within the corporation.
Perhaps the main criticism of the Connecticut statute is its seeming
withdrawal of discretion from the court to determine whether to
order sale. Once the shareholder who seeks to buy off the dissolu-
tion suit applies for appraisal, the procedure which apparently fol-
lows is automatic and mandatory, since the court "shall" determine
fair value and, if the applicant elects to buy the shares at fair value,
the court "shall" enter the order of sale. It would seem better to
leave the court some discretion, as under the English statute, to
determine whether to order a buyout. On the other hand, the
Connecticut provision is an advance over the English statute since
Connecticut does not require that the court must first find that
"0 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-1124 to -1127 (Supp. 1965).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
dissolution is appropriate and then order buyout as an alternative.
(c) "Section 210 Relief': Section 210 of the English Companies
Act447 and its many sister provisions in Commonwealth statutes448
offer the most comprehensive relief. Besides the compulsory buy-
out of shares, the English "court may, with a view for bringing to
an end the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit,
whether for regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in the
future," including "any alteration in or addition to any company's
memorandum or articles." In Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc., Ltd. v.
Meyer,4 40 the court ordered a compulsory buyout of the shares of
two minority shareholders who were being virtually persecuted by
the majority stock interest in its efforts to force sale of the minority
interests at a sacrifice price; the court fixed a fair price which it
defined as "the value which the shares would have had at the date
of the petition, if there had been no oppression" of the minority
shareholders.4 0 In another case, the court kicked a domineering,
senile majority shareholder upstairs into an honorary and impotent
executive position and isolated him from any significant contact
with company affairs, but left his shareholdings intact rather than
shift stock control as the petitioners had requested.451' In a more
restrictive mood, the Court of Session of Scotland refused any re-
lief, however merited by the facts, to a shareholder who had been
thrown out of his corporate office on the ground that the statute as
worded remedies only injuries to a shareholder qua shareholder but
not qua director or officer.452 This narrow construction withholds
the statute's compulsion from an area of major concern in a close
corporation, that is, a shareholder's interest in a possibly lucrative
director or officer post. Such a construction would be overruled by
an amendment recommended by the Jenkins Committee.4 3
Perhaps the most serious restriction in existing section 210 is the
fact that judicial relief is not available unless the court first deter-
mines that the situation warrants dissolution. Then if dissolution
would be in order, the alternative relief may be granted, but not
otherwise. The Jenkins Committee, viewing section 210 as a man-
1,7 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210.
48 *E.g., statutes cited note 443 supra.
'[1959] A.C. 324 (1958).
"o Id. at 369.
"' In re H. R. Harmer, Ltd., [1958] 1 Weekly L.R. 62 (CA.).
482 Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., [1952] Sess. Cas. 49 (Scot. 1st Div. 1951).
"I" Company Law Committee, Report, Cam. No. 1749, at 75 (1962).
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date for courts to grant all needed relief for breach of duty and
oppression of minority interests, has recommended that the remedy
be cut loose from its present connection with dissolution, so that
the "alternative" relief will be available on a showing of need,
whether or not the situation is so serious as to justify dissolution. 454
This tie has been clearly severed in the Northern Ireland and
Ghana versions of section 210, 4 5 and will be in England if Parlia-
ment adopts the Jenkins Committee recommendations.
South Carolina alone among American jurisdictions has adopted
the section 210 idea and vested the courts with the same sweeping
discretion as its English prototype.456  Under the South Carolina
statute, the tie between dissolution and alternative relief is broken,
and relief may be awarded either "as an alternative to a decree of
dissolution, or may be granted whenever the circumstances of the
case are such that relief, but not dissolution, would be appropri-
ate."457 Thus, injury not calling for so drastic a remedy as court-
ordered liquidation may be relieved by a forced share purchase, or
by a change in the by-laws or articles of incorporation, or by some
other form of relief tailored to the facts of the case. Also under the
South Carolina statute, relief is available to a shareholder whether
he is injured in his capacity of shareholder, director, or officer of the
corporation, thereby precluding the restrictive construction of the
English statute from being read into the South Carolina law.458
CONCLUSION
The years 1959-1966 have been a most significant period of de-
velopment in corporation law. On the state level, perhaps the major
accomplishments, besides simplification and clarification of statutes,
have been the increasingly perceptive recognition of close corpora-
tion needs, particularly through separate statutes such as Florida's,
"'Id. at 75-78.
'1 Companies Code, 1961, § 218(2) (Ghana); Companies Act, 1960, 9 Eliz. 2, C.
22, § 201 (3) (No. Ireland).
4i8 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23 (Supp. 1965).
4" S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23(b) (Supp. 1965).
4"Under the South Carolina statute, persons having standing to petition for
judicial dissolution may also seek relief under South Carolina's version of § 210.
Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.15 (a) (4) (Supp. 1965), one may petition for dissolu-
tion on the ground that "the acts of the directors or those in control of the corpora-
tion . . . . (B) are oppressive or unfairly prejudicial either to the corporation or
to any shareholder whether in his capacity as a shareholder, director or officer of
the corporation." Hence, on showing such damage, one may also seek the relief
provided for under S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23 (Supp. 1965).
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and the halting efforts towards uniform rules governing all forms
of corporate fusions. On the other hand, state statutes are obviously
becoming increasingly lax as they give management more and more
leeway in handling corporate affairs. This negative development is
partially offset by the gradual evolution of higher fiduciary stan-
dards for directors, officers, and (in some areas) controlling share-
holders, and particularly by the rapid growth of "federal corporation
law," most evident in the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments. Thus
the overall balance is between increasing state law permissiveness
and widening federal regulation-a development not without paral-
lel in other areas of life and law.
